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Executive Summary
The landmine threat to innocent civilians around the world is personally tragic, but it also represents
a massive challenge to the development and infrastructure of nations at risk. Landmines have
recently been used to target civilian populations and refugees, creating crisis situations regarding
agriculture, indirect health consequences, and developmental choices.
Mine action is a series of activities which, taken together, attempt to ameliorate the effects of
landmines. Mine action components include landmine clearance, mine awareness, and victim
assistance and support activities. These diverse, and sometimes unrelated, operations are undertaken
by numerous organizations, which are not typically under the control of any one organization.
Coordination of effort, therefore is extremely difficult.
The US government humanitarian demining program is predicated on providing limited support to
countries which request aid, and designing the US response to produce a sustainable, host nation-run
demining program as soon as possible. The Interagency Working Group has devised a series of
procedures so that when appropriate, a requesting country can be supported by the Department of
Defense and the Department of State in an effective and efficient manner.
The regional Commanders-in-Chief include humanitarian demining country plans in their umbrella
peacetime strategy of Theater Engagement. Humanitarian demining is one of the family of
humanitarian assistance missions covered by the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic
Assistance (OHDACA) authority.
Special Operations Forces, including Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs
(CA) units possess unique cultural as well as specialized skills which allow them to perform civil
military operations (CMOs), to include humanitarian demining operations. Reserve CA forces, in
particular, possess functional specialties, which mirror civilian professional skills relevant to
infrastructure support and restoration. CA capabilities: planning, coordination, training, and advising
can be applied to various aspects of a mine action campaign.
CA soldiers can coordinate with non-governmental organizations, other US agencies, for-profit
companies, the UN, and other demining players. They can also help the host nation determine
appropriate measures of effectiveness, demining plans and priorities, transition points, and support
the creation of a National Demining Office.
The use of CA reservists, however, is constrained because of the relative importance of demining as a
mission, the perceptions of the CA reserve force, the accessibility of reserve CA personnel, the
configuration and size of CA units, and the funding of reserve forces in support of the demining
program. Nevertheless, these constraints can be overcome and CA can support humanitarian
demining operations effectively, if elements are activated in small teams and for short periods of
time. This is especially true if CA units are expanded (as planned) and if DOD demining funds can
be applied to support of CA reservists performing those missions.
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Foreword
The recent proliferation of peacetime missions for the Department of Defense and the development
of peacetime activities required under the rubric of CINCs’ Theater Engagement plans has been the
motivation for bringing forth this study. In particular, the use of reserve Civil Affairs (CA) assets, the
most accessed and deployed of all reserve force capabilities, has prompted it.
This study, “The Role of Civil Affairs in Mine Action,” is not intended to be read from cover to cover
by most users. It has been researched and written with three target audiences in mind: 1) the Mine
Action official who would like to learn more about the application of Civil Affairs capabilities to
humanitarian demining activities, 2) the Civil Affairs officer who would like to learn more about
challenges and actions within the realm of humanitarian demining operations, and 3) US military
officials who have a responsibility for, or an interest in, the proper unit design and uses of CA forces.
For someone who is interested in determining the capabilities and constraints of the Department of
Defense and its Civil Affairs forces, Sections III, IV and V will provide just such a tutorial. For those
CA soldiers interested in understanding more about the threat of latent landmines and what that
means to the US in terms of national security policy and support actions, Sections I, and II will give
the necessary background.
Sections VI and VII are analytical studies, which evaluate both the pragmatic and conceptual
methods of applying CA capabilities to the demining mission. These sections should help a force
designer or planner to understand the real requirements and environment in which CA elements
function.
This study has tried to avoid being a polemic, but one of the authors being a retired Civil Affairs
soldier; it is highly unlikely that biases have not broken through. Therefore the authors request your
indulgence and solicit all comments and criticisms of this work, and will try to respond to such
feedback.
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Section I. The Nature and Scope of the Landmine Threat
1.

Demining – A Multi-Faceted Issue

Humanitarian demining operations encompass numerous activities related to the relief of human
suffering, which invariably arises in nations at risk from the landmine menace. However, mine
clearance—the physical removal or destruction of landmines or unexploded ordnance (UXO)—is
only a portion of the comprehensive set of actions which comprises the universe of “Mine Action.”
In order to grasp the totality of the demining challenge one must first understand that the problem is
not merely technical, or even humanitarian, but instead a core concern of the developmental scheme
for the affected nation. “Landmine contamination,” President Clinton has observed, “ is not only a
pressing humanitarian problem, but it affects virtually every aspect of life in countries recovering
from civil war or armed conflict.”1 Therefore the President’s goal for eliminating the threat to
civilians posed by landmines, is tied to agricultural, medical, infrastructure, educational, economic,
and social challenges which are collateral consequences of the personal tragedies of landmine
accidents.

2.

The Nature of the Threat

Civilians as Targets
Mines are not used simply to defend strategic areas, which for the short-term might be cordoned off
such as the World War II mines in Egypt. They have been used recently to target civilians by mining
farmland, irrigation systems, freshwater sources, roads, riverbanks, etc. Landmines have also been
used as weapons of terror. The Department of State in its report, Hidden Killers 1998: The Global
Landmine Crisis noted that landmines “are largely a rural, third-world problem.” Typically, forces
withdrawing from a region will mine the rural infrastructure. “Unfortunately, such tactics mean that
when combat moves on, the former inhabitants of the town are left to live in a minefield.”2
Unusable Land
Hidden Killers made specific findings that the relevant measure of the landmine problem is not the
number of landmines in a country, but the amount of land “rendered unusable by the presence or
suspected presence of landmines.”3 Consider the effect that only a few mines can have on a village:
“In 1996 Norwegian People’s Aid cleared a village in Mozambique, after it had been abandoned by
the entire population of around 10,000 villagers due to alleged mine infestation. After three months
of work, the deminers found four mines. Four mines had denied access to land and caused the
migration of 10,000 people.”4
Collateral Costs
The amount of land rendered unusable is only one of the problems posed by landmines. Hidden
Killers 1998 highlights hidden costs, in addition to those of mine removal ($300–$1,000 per mine)
and prostheses ($100–$3,000 per device). Hidden costs are associated with diverted medical
resources, impediments to the return of refugees, destruction of livestock, the disruption of economic
6

patterns, and inhibited tourism (e.g. in the vicinity of Victoria Falls).5 In hindering travel, the
presence of landmines inhibits the mobility of teachers, technicians, doctors, and limits access to
polls, thus diminishing democratic participation and development. The report further noted that in
war-torn areas demining facilitates the demobilization of soldiers and the return of refugees, while
helping to reestablish community services: “meaningful employment, the availability of goods and
services, particularly food, and the restoration of normal community services (schools, electricity,
water supply, roads, and other communication systems).”6
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC),
H. Allen Holmes, also has noted the impact of landmines:
“The failure or inability of a country to address the proliferation of anti-personnel
landmines, beyond the obvious personal suffering, denies farmers use of their fields,
which stymies the resumption of agricultural production, denies access to markets,
reduces public confidence in fledgling governments and creates many other hurdles
for a nation trying to heal the wounds of war. So beyond the injuries inflicted and the
medical expenses incurred, mine fields drive whole societies into helpless poverty
with no obvious way out.
Humanitarian demining is one of the most fundamental humanitarian missions that
the United States—and special operations forces, including civil affairs—can be
involved in and is a high priority for the Clinton administration.”7
A Worsening Problem
The broad impact of landmines is not hard to trace. Even the mechanics of landmine removal
become difficult because of the social dynamic impact. Colonel Lionel Dyck of MineTech
described the social dynamic impact of mines as it applies directly to landmine removal:
“Throughout the world, where mines are planted, be it one mine on a soccer field or
two hundred mines in an agricultural area, the local people are the ones who are
affected and denied this ground. They are the ones who “more or less” know where
the mines are. Thus, they don’t go there. In time this area becomes totally moribund
with re-growth and there is no marking. For safety reasons, the locals give a wider
and wider berth to the problem area. The overgrowth gets thicker and thicker and
spreads, and more and more ground is denied for agriculture, building, or any other
form of development. The deminers’ greatest problem is born.”8
Without the bush, “the clearance and removal of the mines becomes a routine exercise to deminers.
Deminers, in the main, are constantly seeking a safe and effective means for penetrating the bush.”9
The presence of landmines alters human behavior in ways both obvious and subtle, which make the
removal of landmines more difficult.
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Indirect Health Consequences
The social dynamic impact of landmines also produces indirect health consequences. While the most
visible victims of landmines are the amputees, their families and others also typically suffer greatly.
Malnutrition, cholera, and the spread of polio and malaria are some indirect health consequences due
to the presence of landmines. The following table illustrates typical, indirect effects of a landmine
threat.

Influence Point

Condition(s) or Behavior
Altered

Diseases Especially
Increased

Agricultural land, water
canals mined

Farming activities decrease
causing food scarcity

Malnutrition-related diseases

Access to drinking water
and firewood limited
because of mines

People drink contaminated
water

Waterborne diseases such as
bacterial diarrhea,
Amoebiasis, Giardiasis, etc.

Roads, bridges, and access
to public places mined

Mobile vaccination teams
avoid the area

All six childhood killer (but
preventable) diseases

Increased amputation and
injury requiring blood
infusion

Increased demand and
frequency of blood
transfusion

Contaminated blood
transfusion diseases (HIV,
trypanosomiasis, malaria)

Mined roads prevent food
transport

People subsist on local
Iodine deficiency disorders
food products that may be
iodine deficient
Probable Indirect Public Health Consequences of Landmines10
Developmental Consequences
In addition to those social and health issues stemming from landmine contamination, the
consequences for development must likewise be considered. J. Brian Atwood, the Director of US
Agency for International Development (USAID) , has described the landmine problem from the
developmental perspective. His concern is development—the transition of a war-torn society to a
democracy. “This usually means inserting peacekeeping forces, demobilizing soldiers, reintegrating
them into civilian life, creating alternative media outlets that encourage peace and reconciliation and
encouraging people at the community level to work together on small projects that are both vital in
returning the society to normal and in demonstrating that people can participate together in deciding
on and implementing of positive change.” At each step, he says, landmines have to be considered.11
Similarly, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has described the nature of mine
action as more than landmine removal:
8

“It is not so much about mines as it is about people and their interactions with a
mine-infested environment. Its aim is not technical—to survey, mark and eradicate
landmines—but humanitarian and developmental–to recreate an environment in
which people can live safely, in which economic, health and social development can
occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination, and in which
victims’ needs are addressed.
A distinction has sometimes been made between operational mine action (i.e. mine
action in support of operations mandated by the [United Nations] UN Security
Council), humanitarian mine action and mine action in support of reconstruction and
development. The United Nations does not adhere to this distinction since it does not
reflect the fact that there is considerable overlap between the various aspects of a
country’s recovery (peacekeeping and peace-building, reintegration of refugees and
[Internally Displaced Persons] IDPs, revival of communities, reconstruction and
development), and that what really matters is the establishment of clear priorities in
relation to the needs of the affected populations.”12
In seeking to address the impact of landmines on a society’s development, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) has applied its expertise towards the “building of sustainable,
national mine action institutions” and to “supporting efforts to integrate mine action into
development planning.” Successful mine action programs are seen as being “well integrated in rural
development and infrastructure programes.”13
Development Options Suggested by the Landmine Threat
Likewise, the World Bank sees a broader picture, affirming that to survey, detect, and remove “is the
most sustainable and direct response to mine pollution.” The World Bank also notes the further need
for “planning for other sectors in reconstruction. Mine pollution affects the comparative expense and
value of differing strategies for repairing of roads and infrastructure, rehabilitating agricultural
production and other areas of reconstruction.” The following questions illustrate the dilemma:
“Is it cheaper and more effective to clear mines from an affected area which preconflict was a major cultivation zone? Or is it more practical, at least in the short
run, to bring other land into production? If a given population is at risk from mines
in a local wooded area due to their need to collect firewood, should the area be
demined, or should they be offered a different source of wood through fast-growing
tree crops or an alternate source of fuel? Should a heavily mined road be demined or
should a new road be built or a lesser road upgraded? Should refugees be resettled in
mine-free areas or should their original homes, heavily mined during the conflict, be
demined?”14 Consideration of these questions is necessary if one hopes to develop an
effective comprehensive mine action program.
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3.

Mine Action Programs

Major Mine Action Components
The component parts of a mine action campaign include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

management systems development (creation of a demining administration);
mine awareness;
geographical surveys;
socio-medical surveys;
prioritization and host nation planning;
mine removal or destruction; and
victim assistance.

Rarely, are these functions planned and even more rarely are they implemented as part of a
comprehensive plan, whether by one organization or as a coordinated effort by many organizations.
Nevertheless they are constantly identified by demining subject matter experts (at both the strategic
and operational level) as necessary components of a successful demining program.
The Phases of a Mine Action Program
While there are differences of opinion as to the evolution of a mine action plan, there is a general
consensus that the phases of a demining campaign should include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

planning;
training;
deployment of personnel and equipment;
operations;
program evaluation; and
transition of operations to the host nation (HN); sustainment.15

Mine action, whether understood as tied to development or not, must be implemented at the local
level. This was emphasized by Ben Lark, mine action coordinator for Handicap International.
“The only way we can understand the way mines and UXO are impacting these
people is to get into those villages at ground level and spend a lot of time with
them; not just the headman. Talk to the women’s groups; talk to the chief of
police; talk to the veteran’s society, it really doesn’t matter. They all have
different problems. This has to be done because only when we understand (their
problems) can we understand how best to tackle them.”16
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Section II. US Government Support of Humanitarian Demining
1.

Initial US Responses to the Humanitarian Demining Challenge

After the recent promulgation of its humanitarian demining program (1993-4), the US government
began to integrate various components of mine action into all its activities designed to facilitate
infrastructure development. At the same time they aimed to foster a sense of host nation indigenous
demining sustainability.
In 1992 Congress found that mines in war-torn regions such as Afghanistan and Somalia were
hindering refugee repatriation and other humanitarian programs. On the basis of this finding, Public
Law, 102–484, Section 1364, directed the President to prepare a report assessing “mine clearing
needs in countries to which refugees and displaced persons are now returning, or are likely to return
within the near future, including Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, Somalia and Mozambique, and an
assessment of current international efforts to meet the mine clearing needs in the countries covered
by the report.” The report, later published as Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared
Landmines, also was to include “an evaluation of the availability of technologies and assets within
the United States Government which, if called upon, could be employed to augment or complete
mine clearing efforts”, in the war-torn countries17.
The initial assessment of the problem posed by landmines began by attempting to determine the
number of uncleared landmines. Quickly the enormity of the problem became apparent. Not only
were there scores of millions of uncleared mines, but developmental problems associated with the
landmine menace were standing in the way of the most basic kinds of recovery and normalcy.

2.

Demining as a Function of National Security

Demining is part of the US national security strategy for peacetime engagement. This strategy views
globalization as a process of accelerating integration in which the United States will be affected by
events beyond our borders. “As governments lose their ability to provide for the welfare of their
citizens, mass migration, civil unrest, famine, mass killings, environmental disasters and aggression
against neighboring states or ethnic groups can threaten US interests and citizens.”18 Consequently
that national security strategy asserts “our citizens have a direct stake in the prosperity and stability
of other nations.”19 This leads to the “imperative of engagement” and the strategic approach that:
“…we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad
unless we are strong at home. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate
instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state
actors. Today’s complex security environment demands that all our instruments of
national power be effectively integrated to achieve our security objectives”.20
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To influence events and prevent crises—to shape the international environment—the US has
diplomacy, military force, and our other foreign policy tools, but these “must be closely integrated.”
The “threats and their consequences cross agency lines, requiring close cooperation among federal
agencies, state and local governments . . . non-governmental organizations and others in the private
sector.”21 Among the other tools available for shaping the international environment, and which
must be integrated, is international assistance, which supports sustainable development programs and
averts crises.22 “The methods for assisting emerging democracies are as varied as the nations
involved”23 and the assistance is through both USAID and the military.
“We assist other countries in improving their pertinent military capabilities, including
peacekeeping and humanitarian response. With countries that are neither staunch
friends nor known foes, military cooperation often serves as a positive means of
engagement, building security relationships today that will contribute to improved
relations tomorrow.”24
Part of this engagement to shape the security environment is demining. Demining in Angola,
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea is part of the strategy for countering
transnational threats of “terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, environmental damage
and disease.”25 In 1995, the Joint Staff and Unified Commanders unanimously supported demining
as a means to further their peacetime engagement strategy.26 Although this describes demining as a
means to support national security interests, it also may occur “because our values demand it.”27

3.

Policy - Country Program Goals

The purpose of the United States Government (USG) Humanitarian Demining Program (HDP) “is to
assist selected countries to relieve human suffering and develop an indigenous demining capability
while promoting US interests.”28 The Department of State (DoS) has estimated that there are
approximately sixty million landmines in place worldwide causing civilian casualties. US Secretary
of State Albright noted that ninety percent of wartime casualties are now civilian.29 Landmines are
increasingly “targeted against civilians—to deny them their livelihoods, to uproot them from their
lands, and to exploit political instability.”30 In addition to being a cause of death and maiming,
landmines deter the return of refugees and rebuilding of society, preventing the full use of
agricultural land and economic recovery
The HDP aims to relieve human suffering associated with landmines through mine awareness and
train-the-trainers, so as to develop an indigenous national demining office (NDO); thus promoting
US foreign policy, security and economic interests.31 The demining of roads, farmland and other
areas of society reduces civilian casualties and impediments to refugee repatriation, to agriculture,
and to commerce while strengthening the country’s social, economic, and governmental
infrastructure. According to national security strategy, “every dollar we devote to preventing
conflicts, promoting democracy, and stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings a sure
return in security and savings.”32
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Demining benefits are to be achieved while promoting the security interests of the host nation and of
the United States. “No member of the armed forces” is to engage in the “physical detection, lifting,
or destroying of landmines” when providing humanitarian and civic assistance and not supporting a
United States military operation.33 The “train-the-trainer” program is therefore designed for
humanitarian and not military purposes; policy allows US forces to train military members for
humanitarian demining.34 To “minimize long-term US involvement and to ensure that the host
country is capable of sustaining operations, training is conducted using the ‘train-the-trainer’
methodology.”35
US foreign policy, security, and economic interests are advanced by strengthening US relations with
other governments, and the host country’s democratic institutions, and by improving US military
training opportunities and US economic ties.36 The strategy is long-term and comprehensive, and it
seeks to coordinate “with other programs and activities—such as the UN, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).”37 The US program involves
both the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DOD). President Clinton’s goal
is “the elimination, by the end of the next decade, of the threat posed by landmines to civilians.”

4.

The Approval Process

The role of the DOD in general, and Civil Affairs (CA) specifically, can be understood more fully
within the context of the formal Interagency Working Group (IWG) approval process. This process
creates the framework and connectivity among the various elements and demonstrates the liaison
activities necessary to achieve a unity of effort within the program. The IWG has been mandated by
Congress, in part because humanitarian assistance operations rendered by the military “shall
complement, and may not duplicate, any other form of social or economic assistance which may be
provided to the country concerned by another department or agency of the United States.”38
The approval process for providing humanitarian demining support to a requesting nation begins
with coordination between the HN and the US country team. Either may initiate the coordination for
obtaining US approval for demining support. The US country team then sends a proposal to the
Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DoS/PM), which in turn informs the
members of the Interagency Working Group (IWG). The IWG is the coordinating body for the US
government demining program with the power to approve or disapprove proposed demining
programs. Approval is based on its assessment of US policy and strategy, review of the demining
proposal, a country assessment, and the project’s requirements as determined by the geographic
Commanders-in-Chief’s (CINC) site survey.
The approval process necessarily includes political assessments. Under Secretary of State Thomas
R. Pickering’s comments on civil-military operations apply to demining. “We have become more
deeply involved in intra- and inter-state politics, realizing full well that security within a country can
affect the stability of a whole region and the interests of the United States.”39 As stated in JP 3-57,
“because of the politico-military nature and sensitivity of CA activities undertaken by US
commanders . . . their conduct should be governed by deliberate policy developed and promulgated
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by the NCA.”40 Policy set by National Command Authority (NCA) allows for continuity and
consistency that is “essential to the success of CA activities, in light of their inherent complexity and
political sensitivity.”41 Indeed, being involved in the site survey and Host nation (HN) liaison
activities, CA personnel confront political factors originating from the DOS policy assessment
including the “responsibilities of the HN,”42 resource estimates, mission constraints, and an exit
strategy.

5.

The Interagency Working Group and Policy Assessment

Department of State at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) formed the IWG.43
Among the objectives of the IWG are to:
• Establish a comprehensive database of countries requiring demining assistance;
• Develop a strategy for encouraging other governments—especially those that
have previously participated in mining activities beyond their borders—to
participate or lead in demining operations;
• Develop a prioritized list of countries requiring USG demining assistance;
• Determine the form of demining assistance to be provided;
• Integrate, where appropriate, USG demining assistance programs with similar
programs run by the United Nations (UN), other international organizations (IO),
and various non-governmental organizations (NGO); and to
• Oversee the allocation of USG demining assistance resources.44
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs (DOS/PM) chairs the IWG, and
the vice-chair is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Missions, Office of Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC). Additionally, the IWG consists of
representatives from the:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

National Security Council;
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy;
Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration;
Department of State, regional bureaus;
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the geographic CINCs and
services;
United States Agency for International Development;
United States Information Agency (USIA); and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The IWG reviews, and applies the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy,
legislation and other policy guidance to demining, national strategy and policy as given in
Presidential directives. The IWG seeks to ensure that demining contributes to national goals.45
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6.

Proposal Review and Country Selection

Each country accepted by the US into the program should exhibit both a political will to support
demining operations and a realistic chance of achieving lasting results. Each of the following
conditions should be considered likely if a US-sponsored humanitarian demining program is
approved. The IWG considers the proposal and determines selection based on these factors:
• US Government Interests.
— Promote human welfare
— Promote stability, democratic process, and economic growth
— Encourage compliance with weapons control policies and conventions
— Facilitate rapid repatriation of refugees
— Access and training opportunities
• Severity of the problem
— Extent of the landmine problem
— Impact on family income and sustenance
— Impact on development of local and national economies
— Impact on agricultural viability
• Impact of US assistance
— Potential to attract other donors
— Opportunity to leverage USG efforts with existing programs
— Opportunity to provide resources, equipment, and training
• Other factors
— Host country capability and willingness to devote resources toward a
sustainable demining program
— Threat of renewed conflict and the prospect of new mining after old
mines are destroyed
— Issuance of a Presidential Determination to allow for security assistance
— Safety of USG personnel.46
The IWG develops goals and objectives for the assistance effort, an exit strategy, and a transition
plan for transferring the program to the host nation. The exit strategy is based on the country’s
capabilities, the scope of the effort, funding sources and availability, and the continuing involvement
of NGOs and PVOs. The Country Team takes the initial lead, “assess[ing] the country’s capabilities
and willingness to sustain the humanitarian demining program.”47 The country team is headed by the
Chief of the diplomatic mission and, as he chooses, the senior members of the represented
departments and agencies of the mission.
After a country has been selected for US support, the Joint Staff (JS) Operations Directorate, Special
Operations Division (SOD) coordinates with the geographic CINCs and the Special Operations
Command (SOC) and to build a Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO) package.48 The package
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is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and is used by the IWG during the
policy assessment visit.

7.

The Policy Assessment Visit

The Department of State conducts a policy assessment visit (PAV) to the host nation.49 DOS/PM
coordination for the visit, with OASD SO/LIC as the deputy lead, includes the Country Team,
USAID, United States Information Agency USIA), the geographic CINC, and host nation. The team
seeks to clarify issues such as the scope of the proposed program, support requirements, and US
expectations with the host nation officials. Additionally, the assessment visit is designed to introduce
key program personnel from both governments and to prepare for the site survey. The assessment
team reviews the security and political conditions of the host nation and determines “whether the
USG will enjoy the cooperation of the host country.”50

8.

Site Survey

The CINC’s Role
Following a positive policy assessment, the geographic CINC is given the responsibility for
conducting the site survey under the auspices of the country team. The IWG requests the site survey
through the OASD SO/LIC and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The regional CINC
provides the results of the policy assessment visit (policy concerns, program objectives, resource
estimates, mission constraints and an exit strategy). The CINC is understood to have the best
perspective for assessing US military participation in a demining program.51 As with any civilmilitary operation (CMO), assessments should consider the “organization and degree of
effectiveness of the host nation government, the condition of the economy, the nature of cultural and
social institutions, and the prevailing perceptions and attitudes of the population.”52
The Strategic Plan lists possible team members for the Site Survey:
•
•
•
—
—

—
—
—

Geographic combatant commander demining staff officers.
Geographic combatant commander-appointed program manager.
Representatives from:
Special Operations Forces (SOF): Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and
Psychological Operations (PSYOP).
The non-SOF community (e.g., logisticians, engineers, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD), US Marines Corps (USMC), doctors, physiotherapists, and US Navy Seabees, as
appropriate).
Supporting units.
USAID.
US Information Services (USIS).53

Goals of the Site Survey
The goals of the site survey, as defined by the IWG are to:
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• Identify resource requirements, including funding, personnel, and equipment;
• Identify logistic requirements (e.g. transportation);
• Identify infrastructure requirements;
• Determine survey and marking requirements;
• Assess ongoing efforts (e.g., by the host country; IOs, NGOs, and PVOs; and other
countries);
• Identify factors that will effect development of the course of action (COA) (e.g., desires of
the ambassador). Again, coordination with the country team and desk officers is critical.
For example, the USIS can provide recommendations on the best way to proceed with
demining efforts based on cultural peculiarities and can conduct public opinion surveys in
advance of the team’s arrival;
• Validate the security and political environment of the country;
• Clarifies the policy concerns, goals, objectives, and exit strategy determined by the IWG,
if necessary;
• Resolves administrative issues, and.54
• Determines logistics requirements, which are driven by the “nature and extent of the mine
and UXO problem.”55
Tasks Appropriate for a Site Survey
Some specific tasks for the site survey team are the general determination of the “nature and extent
of the mine and UXO problem” and a consideration of those critical or time-consuming tasks listed
in TC 31-34 as follows:
• Training requirements for HN personnel in mission planning and organization, mine
awareness, and demining techniques.
• HN logistical support capabilities and processing requirements for contracts.
• HN rules of engagement (ROEs) and security of US forces, including weapon restrictions incountry and restrictions on communications security (COMSEC) material or communications
structures.
• Clearance requirements and suspenses. (Note: Clearances for a demining operation are very
time-consuming and political. The clearances for transporting explosives must go through
US channels and possibly UN and HN bureaucracy.)
• Overflight requirements and landing restrictions due to explosives. (Note: Only certain
airfields and countries allow aircraft with explosives to land, refuel, or stay overnight.)
• Arms embargoes or restrictions on the HN. (Note: An arms embargo by the UN can only be
removed or amended after it has been voted on by the UN Security Council.)
• A soil sample to determine mineral content. (Note: The test allows one to determine if the
mine detector will be effective in this type of environment.)56
• TC 31-34 notes that the site survey is an appropriate time to initiate coordination with NGOs
for possible integration of efforts. The NGOs may fulfil the following roles:
-

Transitioning a HN program effectively from Army Special Operations Forces
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-

-

(ARSOF) training operations to live minefield clearance operations, which
US forces are prohibited from performing.
Providing long-term liaison and oversight functions that are essential for
maintaining continuity in demining operations, yet severely impact the
operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERTEMPO) of US
forces.
Conducting proofing of cleared minefields to verify 100 percent removal from
selected areas for safety and program assessment purposes.57

Survey Results and Plan Formulation Results of the mission assessment are sent to DoS and the IWG
via the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and OASD SO/LIC. Using the survey results and
other information, the IWG establishes project size, measures of effectiveness (MOE), project
restrictions, and participant roles.58
Assuming resolution of the project parameters and IWG approval of the project, the theater CINC
develops plans under the policy guidance of the OASD SO/LIC and the JCS. The theater team then
prepares a concept plan (CONPLAN). This plan “identifies the HN organizational structure,
demining training team composition, and specific objectives and requirements for each team
component, . . . a training plan for HN personnel that integrates national-level headquarters (HQ)
operations, mine awareness, and mine clearance training.” The CONPLAN includes a request for
deployment of forces and a time line, which the CINCSOC submits to CJCS for adequacy, feasibility
and compatibility. The J3 SOD staffs the plan to the IWG for comments and approval.59
The IWG is responsible for resolving major issues, identifying resources and gaps, and developing a
resource package. This must be done by taking into account not only DOD operations and
maintenance (O&M) funds, and humanitarian assistance funding, but also Foreign Military
Financing through the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and coordination with
USAID whose funds are not controlled by the IWG. Following IWG, CJCS and Secretary of
Defense approval, CJCS transmits the deployment order and the CINCSOC executes the plan.60
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Section III. The Role of the Department of Defense and Civil Affairs
1.

Overview

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
(SO/LIC) established the DOD Humanitarian Demining Program with FY94 funding appropriated
specifically for humanitarian demining efforts, and provides high-level guidance for demining within
DOD’s worldwide peacetime engagement policy.61 The Defense Security and Cooperation Agency
oversees the program requirements of the effort. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff helps the
CINCs with planning and execution of support for humanitarian demining operations (HDO). The
goal of the DOD mission is:
“. . . the establishment of indigenous, self-sustaining, national-level programs within
those countries approved for support by the joint Department of State/Department of
Defense (DoS)/DOD Interagency Working Group (IWG) for Humanitarian
Demining. To achieve this end not only must training and equipment for all facets of
the programs be supplied directly to the host nation (HN), but also the coordination
and facilitation of additional support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) must be integrated.
HD operations have significant dual benefits such as providing urgently needed
humanitarian support and enhancing US military readiness. Regional CINCs and
USCINCSOC will support demining activities that provide benefit to US national
and regional objectives in peacetime engagement, regional stability, promoting
democracy, and economic development.”62
The Commander-in-Chiefs of the geographic commands conduct the demining operations within
their respective area of responsibility (AOR) and use their Theater Engagement Plans to prioritize
and synchronize peacetime activities. The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides
the geographic CINCs with Special Operations Forces (SOF) to train mine clearance, leadership,
communications, and emergency medical treatment skills.63

2.

Demining as a Civil-Military Operation

The Nature of Civil-Military Operations
Humanitarian demining is part of the civil-military operations (CMO) family. CMO are described in
Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 (Joint Civil Affairs Doctrine) as follows:
“CMO encompass the activities that JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] take to
establish and maintain relations between their forces and the civil authorities and
general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas
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where their forces are employed. JFCs plan and conduct CMO to facilitate military
operations and help achieve politico-military objectives derived from US national
security interests. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations entail
interaction between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and
governmental, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and international
organizations (IOs) as part of missions tasked to a JFC. These activities occur before,
during, subsequent to or in the absence of other military actions. The term “civilmilitary operations” is a broad term used to denote activities of a commander that
establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces and civil
authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a
friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and
consolidate operational objectives. Civil Affairs may include performance by military
forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government.
These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions.
They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of military operations.”64
Cultural Expertise as a CMO Asset
Cultural difficulties including religious and political issues are assessed during the pre-mission
survey and corresponding matters such as proper dress and code of conduct, once established, are
closely followed. Knowledge of issues such as fasting during Ramadan, appropriateness of alcohol
consumption, and fatalistic beliefs regarding those injured by landmines, all affect the ability of the
operator to do his job more effectively.65 Governing bodies, religious leaders, documents, statutes,
military leaders, police, ethnic groups, country and community needs assessments, are all good
sources of information as well as key decision-makers and facilitators.66
Since cultural, linguistic, and liaison skills can contribute to mission success at the strategic,
operational or tactical level, “dedicated CA forces, by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation,
cultural awareness, experience in military-to-host nation advisory and assistance activities . . . are
essential.”67 At any given time, CA personnel may be involved in a CMO (such as a demining
campaign) at various levels,:
“At the strategic level planners may be focusing on the exit strategy while operational
and tactical level commanders are planning and conducting activities in support of
immediate operations. The successes of the near-term operational and tactical level
activities enable the execution of a successful exit strategy.”68
Effective Planning and Coordination of Civil-Military Operations
Planning and coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is important for achieving
the maximum synchronized effect. As emphasized in JP 3-57, “Close coordination and cooperation
with these groups should reduce costs, prevent duplication, lessen the friction of potential rivalry,
and improve results.”69 The focus at the strategic level is national security as well as those larger,
long-term, regional issues “such as economic development and stability, national or host government
infrastructure.”70 As with all Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) the aim is to relieve or reduce
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threats to “life or loss of property […] by conducting operations limited in scope and duration.”71
The “primary focus of [foreign humanitarian] assistance is to foster self-reliance.”72 And, by statute,
the operation is to promote both “(A) the security interests of both the United States and the country
in which the activities are to be carried out; and (B) the specific operational readiness skills of the
members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.”73
Planning for demining operations requires accurate assessments of the HN. Typically in CMO, CA
elements help to ensure that surveys are conducted to provide accurate assessments.74 Operational
Plans (OPLANs) “should clearly delineate responsibilities, constraints, and limitations in light of
other agencies’ established parameters and should emphasize the importance of coordinating CMO
concerns and intent.”75 This planning “may entail research, surveys, planning, and coordination of
both DOD and non-DOD organizations and agencies.”76
Establishing Measures of Effectiveness
The formulation of a coherent strategy prior to operations “is imperative to achieve success” in the
mixed environment of military, UN agencies, IOs, and NGOs. A “concise strategy will facilitate the
measurement of the level of success . . . through appropriate measures of effectiveness (MOE), as
well as measure the level of improvement in the quality of life of the populace through normality
indicators.”77
Establishing MOE builds clarity of purpose and unity of effort. They help all those involved in the
demining effort to gauge the progress of the mission and understand their contribution. JP 3-57 gives
the following description:
“MOE provide a baseline of indicators on how well the military achieves its specific
(possibly limited) goals according to its mission statement. Such measures are
situation dependent, often requiring readjustment as the situation changes and higher
level guidance develops. MOE normally are discrete, quantifiable, and helpful in
understanding and measuring progress . . .. They help identify effective strategies and
tactics and points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or
terminate the mission.”78
In developing MOE, several factors have been suggested as guidelines.79 MOE are expected to be
appropriate to the situation and audience; mission-related; measurable, or, if qualitative, clearly
stated to prevent misinterpretation; few in number to avoid collection efforts that outweigh their
value; sensitive to changes and useful for guiding responses to those changes. While eliminating
landmines is the grand objective and the number of landmines removed can be a MOE, other
measures have been identified as more relevant to the practical demining effort.80 These measures
include drops in mortality rates, specific areas demined, amounts of productive agricultural land
rendered useable, etc. MOE are useful not only at the strategic level but also at the operational and
tactical levels.
At the operational level, planning is for the full range of activities from deployment to redeployment.
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CA needs to synchronize support for tactical commanders, conduct liaison activities with other
agencies, and, where possible, integrate them into the operations. As joint doctrine makes clear,
“maintaining routine access and dialogue with DoS representatives, senior leaders, and the
interagency community is critical.”81
CA liaison, however, is no less critical at the tactical level where dealing with local officials can be
very personal. Military humanitarian activities, in turn, can have a more direct impact on the local
populace than on more elevated (and thus less affected) inhabitants and officials. For instance,
performing a civic action mission, such as digging a well, may seem to be elementary until one
realizes that land values, market sites, and local politics may be impacted greatly by the site of that
well. The responsibility of operational commanders includes allocating and distributing resources to
“enable subordinate commanders to execute CMO.”82
Tactical level CMO are more narrowly focused and may include “local security operations,
distribution of food and water, processing and movement of refugee and displaced persons, and basic
medical support.”83 At this level the various phases of a demining operation are often performed by
special operations forces or active duty CA forces.
The Interagency Context of CMO
Multiple agencies interacting with the US military requires developing procedures for effective
cooperation. The guidance given in JP 3-57 is that, “obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in
an interagency operation should not be equated to the C2 [command and control] of a military
operation. The various agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and
decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge.”84 Several agencies may be involved in
a country’s demining effort; unity of effort may be achieved best by applying the leadership principle
that “action will follow understanding.”85
All US government personnel in a country, except those assigned to a combatant command, are
under the control of the Ambassador, designated as chief of mission. Assisting the Ambassador is the
US country team, from which the demining program approval process began. The Country Team is
“the foundation for rapid interagency consultation, coordination, and action on recommendations
from the field and effective execution of US missions, programs, and policies.”86 Political,
economic, administrative, consular, public affairs, regional security officers, and communications
staff along with attachés from DOD, Department of Agriculture typically form a Country Team.
Also represented are other agencies, such as United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), that provide economic development and humanitarian assistance to advance US economic
and political interests overseas. Coordination keeps the involved elements informed and is essential
to achieve unity of purpose.87 Indeed, it has been argued that “the link between mine clearance and
economic development could be maximized by closer cooperation among US government agencies
throughout the process.”88 Others to be included are military liaison and other agency personnel
from the HN, as well as NGOs and IOs.
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3.

Army Special Operations Forces

Force Types and Tasks
The Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are assigned to the United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM), which includes the Army Special Forces (SF) groups, Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) units, in addition to some Army Rangers, Navy sea-airland (SEAL) teams and Air Force special operations wings. These forces support the National
Military Strategy by performing certain core tasks. USSOCOM has prioritized these tasks and
determined that all are either increasing in relevance to the strategic environment or are at a steady
state.89
Task
Counterproliferation
Counterterrorism
Foreign Internal Defense
Special Reconnaissance
Direct Action
Psychological Operations
Civil Affairs
Unconventional Warfare
Information Operations

Trend
Increasing
Increasing
Increasing
Increasing
Steady State
Increasing
Steady State
Steady State
Increasing

The skills necessary for the tasks of Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs, Psychological
Operations and Information Operations “fully support” the national security objectives of shaping the
international environment.90
SOF Demining Tasks
In the US DOD demining program, SF teams typically “train-the-trainers” to increase host nation
mine clearance capabilities, PSYOP supports the development of popular mine awareness
campaigns, and CA contributes interagency, social structure, and management training expertise. The
ARSOF are used not only because they have the technical, public affairs, and social structure
expertise, but also possess “unique qualifications of language, cultural awareness, and area
orientation.”91
Upon IWG’s approval of the resource plan, the theater assessment team provides CINCSOC with a
detailed OPLAN.92 Whether conducting a principal or collateral operation, “SOF must be
incorporated into—and must fully support—the regional and country plans of the geographic CINCs
and US ambassadors.”93 As one of their collateral activities, SOF support demining operations in all
geographic areas of responsibility, conducting demining operations around the world, including
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Yemen, Jordan, Laos and Cambodia.
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ARSOF is uniquely suited for conducting missions such as strategic reconnaissance, unconventional
warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, and humanitarian
assistance.94 SOF have the language and technical skills to train HNs and assist them in developing
their social infrastructure to remove landmines so that harm to innocent civilians may be prevented,
victims assisted, and land may be returned to productive use.
Training and Readiness Benefits
The program allows SOF to hone their skills in countries that may not otherwise be accessible to US
forces. The Special Operations Commander for the Pacific, Brigadier General Schwartz notes,
“The training and skills of SOF are in high demand. The fact that SOF personnel are ready, mature,
professional, and culturally aware underwrites our involvement throughout the pacific region,
supporting the CINC strategy of engagement.” This training is seen as “a significant, relatively lowcost tool in the strategy of engagement.”95
“ARSOF engaged in other nations during peacetime will acquire and sustain
situational awareness in regions where US interests exist or emerge expediently.
Close contact in military-to-military settings or contact with the local populace will
enhance respect, establish or improve relations, reduce tension, and when required,
facilitate coalition operations. Continued emphasis on joint and interagency
interoperability will be paramount for ARSOF peacetime engagement activities.
ARSOF peacetime engagement in 2010 will provide a low-key presence that is
politically acceptable and readily convertible to military operations.”96
Similarly, Army Reserves can play a significant role in supporting peacetime engagement. In
USPACOM, reserve engineer and medical units are the principal actors in Humanitarian
Assistance/Civic Action projects whose activities “have significantly improved the quality of
bilateral relationships with the host nations.”97 While HDO provide training benefits, the Army also
points out that these operations have”…significantly improved the quality of bilateral relationships
with the host nations.”98
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CJCSI 3207.01, B-1. The geographic CINCs “in coordination with the chiefs of the US
diplomatic missions,” shall:
a. Plan, support, and conduct civil affairs activities in their areas of responsibility.
These activities shall be designed to achieve the following:
(1) Support the Unified Combatant Commander’s missions and objectives.
(2) Support the goals and programs of other US Government Agencies related to
civil affairs consistent with those authorities governing DOD involvement.
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(3) Provide for training of US civil affairs forces within their areas of
responsibility. Coordinate the training with the Commander in Chief, US Special
Operations Command (USCINCSOC), for civil affairs units and personnel
assigned to the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).
(4) Effect coordination and liaison with other US Government Agencies operating
in their areas of responsibility.
b. Ensure the integration of civil affairs activities into military plans.
c. Designate a staff element with responsibility for coordinating civil affairs
activities.
DODD 2000.13.
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JP 3-57, I-2–3, 5. The last part is the definition of Civil Affairs given in Department of
Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs, June 27, 1994, ASD (SO/LIC).
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“before civil affairs activities are conducted, the long-term impact on current US security policy
goals and objectives in general and on the host country in particular will be considered.”
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is the integration information into command intelligence programs.
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Section IV. Civil Affairs Capabilities
1.

The Basic Civil Affairs Mission

It is Department of Defense (DOD) policy to “maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil
affairs activities necessary to support DOD missions and to meet DOD Component responsibilities to
the civilian sector in foreign areas in peace and war throughout the range of military operations.”99
“Civil Affairs activities” include actions that “coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of
the US government, with civilian agencies of other governments, and with non-governmental
organizations . . . provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of
civilian authorities. This expertise is applied to implementing DOD policies that advise or assist in
rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.”100 The Civil Affairs role must be considered
when plans are made. The commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands have the
responsibility to “ensure the integration of civil affairs into military plans.”101 CA activities
ultimately are directed toward achieving “an orderly and prompt transition of civilian sector
responsibilities from the DOD Components to non-DOD authorities.”102
Civil Affairs activities include: civil assistance; civil administration in friendly territory; civil
administration in occupied territory; populace and resource control; foreign nation support;
humanitarian assistance; military civic action; and emergency services. These activities are carried
out initially by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, which is the only active component (AC) unit with
about 200 assigned personnel at Fort Bragg, NC. The remaining 97 percent of civil affairs personnel
are in the reserve component (RC) consisting of about 5500 personnel in 36 units situated throughout
the US.

2.

The Active Component Civil Affairs Mission

The AC largely consists of generalists who deploy quickly and support immediate CMO needs and
conduct area assessments to lay the groundwork for functional specialists who are reservists. The
96th Bn has the capabilities to:103
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Plan, train, and prepare US and foreign national (FN) military forces to execute
CA activities in support of CMO;
Conduct CA activities in support of SOF and conventional forces;
Provide cultural and linguistic expertise to the supported command;
Plan and coordinate populace resource control;
Plan and coordinate military civic action;
Plan and coordinate humanitarian assistance;
Plan and coordinate emergency services;
Plan and coordinate foreign nation support;
Provide support and assistance to interagency, NGO, international organization,
and FN agencies;
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•
•
•
•

3.

Supplement IO and PSYOP plans;
Deploy with classified/unclassified communications links (LAN/WAN [local area
network/wide area network], global phone, SATCOM);
Rapidly deploy within 24-96 hours by all means of infiltration; and
Operate independently in austere environments, within the constraints of force
protection, with minimal support.

The Reserve Component CA Mission

The Reserve Component, Civil Affairs (RC CA) units are organized into 36 units, which are
regionally trained, assigned, and apportioned. Traditionally, the rank structure of RC CA is very high
owing to the advanced civilian-acquired skills, which are often required of CA missions. Units and
assigned personnel are recruited, trained, and organized to provide expertise in 16 functional areas –
areas of a professional nature and found primarily in the civilian world. The Civil Affairs Special
Functions fall into one of four categories: Government Function; Economic Function; Public
Facilities Function; and Special Functions.
Government Function
Public Administration
Public Education
Public Health
Public Safety
Legal
Public Facilities Function
Public Communications
Transportation
Public Works & Utilities

Economic Function
Civilian Supply
Economic Development
Food & Agriculture
Special Functions
Civil Information
Cultural Relations
Dislocated Civilians
Emergency Services
Environmental Management

The capabilities of these functional specialists are as follows:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Public Administration
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of foreign
national (FN) public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems and how these impact
CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of public administration systems, agencies, and resources.
Liaison and coordinate with FN government administrators and agencies in support of CMO.
Advise and assist in the restoration, establishment, organization and operation of public government
systems and agencies.
Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies and procedures for
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providing government services to the local population.

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Public Education
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public,
parochial and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and how these impact CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of public education systems, agencies, facilities and resources.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public education system to
support government administration (primary, secondary, and post-secondary educational systems).
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of public education systems
and agencies.
Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO and US assistance and resources to
support local government education systems as part of CMO.
Public Health
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public
and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources and facilities.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and how these impact
CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
Coordinate the use of FN government and private health resources for military use, CMO and in
support of government administration.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources
to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation & storage,
transportation (ambulance), skilled personnel, education, etc.)
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, delivery and maintenance of government
public health systems and agencies.
Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and
resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
Advise and assist FN, international organization, NGO, US government agencies in the prevention,
control and treatment of diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation).
Public Safety
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public
safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and how these impact CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to
support government administration (police/law enforcement administration, fire protection,
emergency rescue, and penal systems).
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•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government public safety
systems and agencies.
Assist in the employment of public safety resources to support government administration, CMO,
and military use.
Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and
resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
Legal
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN legal
systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, laws, codes and statutes.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of legal systems and how these impact CMO.
Assist the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) in the education and training of US personnel in the FN legal
system, obligations and consequences.
Advise and assist the SJA in international law issues.
Coordinate with the SJA to assist and advise local FN judicial agencies.
Liaison and monitor the local FN judiciary system, to de-conflict differences in administration of
laws, agreements and policies.
Public Communications
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of government
and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and how these impact CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of communication equipment, facilities and systems.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial
communications resources to support government administration (postal services, telephone,
telegraph, radio, television, computer systems, and print media).
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government
communications systems and agencies.
Assist in the employment of public communications resources to support government administration
and CMO.
Public Transportation
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public
and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and how these impact CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of transportation equipment, facilities and systems.
Coordinate the use of government and commercial transportation resources for military use, CMO
and in support of government administration.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial
transportation resources to support government administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and
railways, boats and waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).
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•

•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government transportation
systems and agencies.
Public Works and Utilities
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN public
and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and how these impact
CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of works and utilities equipment, facilities and systems.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works
and utilities resources to support government administration (electric power, natural gas, water
production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; public facilities,
etc).
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, operation and maintenance of government
works and utilities systems and agencies.
Assist in the employment (coordination) of public works and utilities resources to support
government administration and CMO.
Food and Agriculture
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of food and
agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of food and agriculture systems and how these impact
CMO.
Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight/supervision for the
rehabilitation or establishment of food and agriculture systems and agencies for production,
processing, storage, transportation, distribution, and marketing, etc.
Coordinate the use of FN government and commercial food and agriculture resources for military
use, CMO and in support of government administration.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and agriculture resources
(livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber and forestry) management to support
government administration.
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, delivery and maintenance of food and
agricultural systems and agencies.
Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and
resources to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (i.e. crop and livestock
improvement, agricultural training and education, etc.).
Economic Development
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in monitoring and assessment of the FN economy,
economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and how these impact CMO.
Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight/supervision for the
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•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•

rehabilitation or establishment of economic and commercial systems, agencies, and resources.
Advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue producing systems
and treasury operations.
Advise and assist in price control and rationing programs.
Develop and implement plans to prevent black-market activities.
Liaison and coordinate with local government administration agencies and commercial enterprises in
support of CMO.
Advise and assist in the restoration, establishment, organization and operation of economic and
commerce systems, agencies and organizations.
Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (i.e.
price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black-market activities, monetary/fiscal policies,
and labor).
Advise and assist in the employment of local commercial resources, to include labor, to support
government administration, CMO, and military use.
Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and
resources to support local economic development as part of CMO.
Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies. Ensure compliance
with international laws and conventions regarding use of labor.
Civilian Supply
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of public and
commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources and facilities.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and how these impact CMO.
Determine availability of local supplies.
Identify private and public property available for military use.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of government and commercial supply systems and facilities.
Coordinate the use of government, commercial and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment
and other resources for military use, CMO and in support of government administration.
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government and
commercial supply systems and agencies.
Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and commercial
supply resources to support government administration (transportation, storage, distribution to
include rationing, and use of captured and salvaged items).
Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies when acquiring and
using local resources (i.e. supplies, equipment and facilities).
Establish policies and procedures concerning custody and administration of public and private
property.
Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and
resources to support local civilian supply needs as part of CMO.
Emergency Services
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of government
36

•
•
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•
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•
•
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•
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emergency services capabilities and resources to respond to the employment of nuclear, biological
and chemical (NBC) weapons and hazardous material (HazMat) incident.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of emergency service systems and how these impact CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of emergency services systems, equipment, and facilities.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government emergency services
systems to support government administration during an NBC or hazardous material (HazMat)
incident (police/law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, restoration of
other vital services, etc.).
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment and maintenance of government emergency
services plans, policies and procedures.
Assist in the coordination and employment of emergency services resources to support government
administration, CMO, and military use (i.e. mitigation, detection, warning, response and recovery).
Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and
resources to support local government emergency-service systems as part of CMO.
Environmental Management
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of FN
environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and pollution control systems and how
these impact CMO.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the rehabilitation or establishment
of environmental resource management systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
Coordinate the use of FN government and private environmental management resources for military
use CMO and in support of government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover to
environmental activities.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for environmental management services
and resources to support government administration (plans, policies and procedures to protection
natural resources, and provide pollution control etc.)
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, delivery and maintenance of government
environmental management systems and agencies.
Advise, assist and support the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government
assistance and resources to support local government environmental management as part of CMO.
Cultural Relations
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance on FN social and cultural matters and how they
impact CMO.
Assist in the familiarization, education, and training of US personnel in the FN social, cultural,
religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior and language.
Advise and assist in the locating, identification, preservation and protection of significant cultural
property.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the protection, preservation, and
restoration of significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated
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places, museums, monuments, art, archives, libraries, etc).
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community and private
systems and agencies to protect preserve and restore cultural property.
Advise and assist in the rehabilitation, establishment, operation and maintenance of cultural property
systems and agencies.
Assist in locating, identifying, determining ownership, and safeguarding cultural property.
Assist in the coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US government assistance and
resources to support local government relations as part of CMO.
Civil Information
Advise and assist in the development and coordination of public relations activities to support
government administration, CMO and the “single voice” message.
Advise, assist, develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the employment of
civil information (mass media) agencies and resources to support CMO (radio, TV, print/newspaper)
both public and private.
Assist PSYOP forces in the planning, development, and dissemination of proclamations, ordinances,
and notices.
Advise and assist the public affairs officer (PAO) in maintaining cultural awareness while dealing
with the media.
Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.
Dislocated Civilians
Provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in the identification and assessment of dislocated
civilian activities.
Develop plans and provide operational oversight/supervision for the protection, care, control, process
and repatriation of dislocated civilians in support of CMO.
Assist in the planning, organization, and coordination of FN, international organization, NGO, US
government assistance and resources to support local government care, control, processing and
repatriation of dislocated civilians as part of CMO.

4.

Recent Applications of Civil Affairs Capabilities

From the rescue operation in Grenada in 1983 and continuing through nine deployment cycles in
Bosnia (into the year 2000), the Army CA force, consisting of various combinations of active
component (AC) and reserve component (RC) soldiers, has been employed in almost all significant
US military operations.
Civil Affairs forces (including a volunteer CA task force) were instrumental in conducting emergency
feeding and shelter operations, as well as government restoration operations, in Panama during
Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY. CA forces were again called upon during
Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (this time via Presidential call-up), and
operated displaced civilian camps in Saudi Arabia, planned with the Kuwaiti government for the
rebuilding of the infrastructure of that country, and worked as high-level government advisors to the
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re-established government of Kuwait.
During the relief operations in Kurdistan (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT), CA forces were again
deployed to create a temporary infrastructure for returning Kurds, and to coordinate relief efforts
with many international players along the Turkish-Iraqi border.
CA planners helped devise methods for the US amphibious support to Bangladesh (operation SEA
ANGEL) in the wake of its devastating typhoon, and CA AC and RC soldiers teamed up once again
to bring order and stability to the Haitians during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY; a highranking team of Reservists also created a plan for the reorganization of the judicial system there.
But the most continuous use of CA reservists has been in the former Yugoslavia. CA reservists have
undertaken numerous civil-military and liaison tasks beginning in 1995 and continuing through the
present day. Most of these activities have taken place in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo, supporting
UN, international, and security force missions.
The recent use of CA has been widespread and multi-faceted. During the past 17 years, CA soldiers
have performed menial (distributing humanitarian assistance supplies) but more often, strategic
(planning major civil-military operations and acting as advisors at the Presidential and Ministerial
levels) tasks. CA advisors have offered support in most of their functional areas, including public law
and safety, public administration, public transportation, banking, agriculture, electric power, contract
negotiations, medical support, education, and the care and treatment of displaced persons and
refugees.
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Department of Defense Directive 2000.13 Civil Affairs, June 27, 1994, ASD (SO/LIC).
Civil Affairs is defined as follows: “The activities of a commander that establish, maintain,
influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental
and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of
operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil
affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the
responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to
other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of military operations.”
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DODD 2000.13.

101

Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs, D.3.b.
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DODD 2000.13.
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US Army Field Manual 41-10 (Draft, May 1999).
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Section V. Civil Affairs Capabilities Applied to Demining
1.

Humanitarian Demining as a Civil-Military Operation

Civil Affairs (CA) is a capability designed exclusively for civil-military operations (CMO).
Demining is an activity, essentially civil-military in character, that can be enhanced in many ways by
skills which validated CA personnel possess. Therefore, it is not surprising that as the US demining
program began, CA was seen as having “a key role in relating to local demining entities and helping
104
them to develop sustainable programs.”
Civil Affairs missions may impact directly or indirectly on mine action operations: civil assistance;
civil administration in friendly territory; civil administration in occupied territory; populace and
resource control; foreign nation support; humanitarian assistance; military civic action; and
emergency services.
CA and Demining Requirements
CA missions may be matched with humanitarian demining requirements, such as developing
coordinated and comprehensive plans conducting successful demining operations; ascertaining the
sufficiency of infrastructure to support deployment; establishing rudimentary management systems;
creating mechanisms for coordinating operations; ensuring sustainability of future programs; and
achieving a successful transition to the host nation. [Note: Appendix A contains tables which
indicate levels of support appropriate to mine action tasks, by phase.]
The general role of CA in demining operations is described in draft demining doctrine as follows: CA
assets conduct humanitarian demining operations as part of an integrated effort with Special Forces
(SF) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces to support US government and theater command
objectives. CA supports demining activities by assisting in training the national HQ staff and by
conducting liaison activities with the host nation (HN) infrastructure, the UN, and international or
local NGOs. CA assistance focuses on training leadership skills, management techniques, and staff
procedures required for the HQ to command, to control, and to communicate effectively with its
subordinate organizations. CA assistance is provided to integrate the national demining office
(NDO) into the HN infrastructure.105 CA activities ultimately are directed toward achieving “an
orderly and prompt transition of civilian sector responsibilities from the DOD Components to nonDOD authorities.”106
In the following sections, the key requirements and activities of Mine Action campaigns are analyzed
to determine if CA capabilities can conduct or support that action.

2.

Prioritization and Plans

Early and Integrated Planning
Achieving unity of effort among all agencies involved in mine action requires early planning and
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coordination. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) states that “to maximize the effect of
judicious military deployments, the civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely
with the military components.[...] Integrated planning and effective management of agency
operations early on in an operation can [. . .] create unity of effort.”107 It is also true that planning at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels is important for achieving the maximum effect, and CA
is involved at all three levels. Therefore, the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands have
the responsibility to “ensure the integration of civil affairs into military plans.”108
“It is important that Civil Affairs plans and considerations be incorporated into the
front-end planning process for US operations abroad. Civil Affairs activities must be
a part of an overall national strategy, formulated and managed at the interagency level
cascading down into theater and/or regional level plans and operations . . .. Routine
access to senior leaders at all levels of this interagency environment is critical.”109
Planning and Prioritizing
Planning for a mine action campaign is not a linear process. Indeed, most planning needs to be done
by describing an end-state (typically for mine action, the end-state is the time when a host country
can sustain a mine action program with only minimal outside help) first and then working in reverse
chronological order. Attention also has to be paid to the transition, or hand-off, point. Therefore, it is
important that CA plans and considerations be incorporated into the front-end planning process for
US operations.110
Setting priorities is directly related to understanding the problem. This comprehension is often
derived from listening to discussions with host nation personnel, donors, NGOs, and other US
government agencies, all of whom may have operating plans, or at least insights of their own.111
Another reason for considering each level of planning early in the process is that the prioritization of
mine action projects is critical. Demining projects and schedules must reflect goals and
developmental objectives of the host nation. These plans and priorities will direct NGOs, contractors,
deminers, logistic support personnel, mine awareness teams, victim assistance activities, etc. While
the host nation is responsible for planning, integrating, and prioritizing it’s demining efforts, this is
not always possible. The host nation may not have an effective national demining office (NDO),
likewise, it may be incapable or unwilling to take on that task. Nevertheless there remains the “need
for an objective analysis of the requirements of affected communities, and structuring and conduct of
operations to meet these requirements.”112
CA: Flexible but Constrained
If this is the case, a CA liaison officer may be of great benefit in helping indigenous people and their
leaders to develop a set of selection criteria for areas to be surveyed, cleared, or attended. Not only is
CA charged with being able to conduct administration and government activities (in the absence of
legitimate or competent authority), but with the knowledge of key infrastructure characteristics
(functional specialties of CA). This gives CA soldiers the ability to apply their expertise about
institutions, services, agriculture, medical, and other attributes, which must be taken into
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consideration when planning and prioritizing demining projects. Civil Affairs personnel should also
facilitate the participation of US operators in the host nation assessments and other activities which
could further the total planning and coordination effort.
Initial contact between CA personnel and other organizations, (HN, IOs, NGOs, etc.) must be made
and relationships developed. These other organizations may well have been working in the country
for months or years and may be “uniquely suited to help the military regarding local conditions.”113
In Bosnia, the 353rd CA Command found a mature NGO infrastructure which “had been at work
more than four years and had developed an extensive network of which CA soldiers could take
advantage.
The relationships between CA and other agents will vary because, in general, “the organization and
command relationships for conduct of CMO are highly variable.”114 There are times when an NGO
will refuse to coordinate with Army personnel. Conversely, there may be times when it may be
wholly inappropriate for US forces to work with particular demining organizations. This range of
scenarios, as well as the wide scope of CA activities “necessitates flexibility in organization,
planning, and execution”115 – a particular characteristic of special operations policies.
Although “CA forces and personnel continue to be the ‘bedrock’ that facilitates the application of
these specialized forces”116 and the coordination of civil-military actions, the “activities of CA forces
should be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with
existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous resources should
be made consistent with the satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.”117
The Planning Process
As part of the planning process, an estimate of the situation is made. Included, as priorities are an
assessment of “host nation current capabilities, especially engineering training and equipment” and
“identification of CA and PSYOP requirements and support for the mission.”118
Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers assigned to the team conduct a pre-deployment site survey
(PDSS) three to six months before deployment. Civil Affairs and PSYOP personnel are expected to
be included in the PDSS.119 In the pre-deployment phase the CA team may be asked to:
•
•
•
•
•

Assess training requirements;
Assess facilities to determine if construction or upgrading is
required;
Identify personnel, equipment (training aids, furniture,
computers, vehicles), and budgetary requirements
Procure necessary equipment and complete contracting
requirements; and to
Identify potential sources of additional support, i.e., the UN,
NGOs, contractors, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), or
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).120
42

CA soldiers can support work on deployment plans, host nation sustainability (hand-off) and
transition plans, while also supporting plans for implementation of the train-the-trainer, mine
awareness, and if applicable, victim assistance operations.

3.

Coordination and Integration

US Goal: Coordinated Effort
Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO), as a subset of Civil-military operations (CMO), attempts
to achieve politico-military objectives. Conducting successful military-to-civil relations entails
interaction among US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, as well as US government
agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), the host nation, for-profit organizations, and
international organizations (IOs).
Coordination amongst these agencies is difficult for several reasons. One reason is, of course, the
multiplicity of agencies involved; numerous agencies exhibit very diverse purposes. One must
consider the different purposes of donor countries, NGOs, UN agencies, for-profit organizations, and
the host nation government itself and match these against a backdrop of cultural or national factors.
In addition to multiple players, another difficulty stems from the wide scope of demining activities
which make up the panoply of a comprehensive mine action program. One typically encounters
activities involved in the functions of mine awareness, mine clearance, and victim assistance. At the
same time, however, there is universal recognition of the necessity for “increased collaboration
among all agencies” to improve efficiency.121
Therefore, to shape the environment and bring order to an almost always complex scenario, the US
faces two similar tasks: to achieve unity of purpose among US government players, and to coordinate
with other demining organizations. Coordination with these groups is not just desirable; it is
essential.
Diplomatic, military, and other foreign policy tools must be closely integrated, since not only the
threat (the effects of anti-personnel landmines) crosses agency lines, but so do functional and
organizational concerns and authorities regarding a mine action program en toto.122 A key goal for
such a highly coordinated program is to keep all the involved elements informed.123
Until recently, peacetime military operators and planners often considered coordinating activities
with the UN and NGOs to be counterproductive, or perhaps a waste of time. However, as a result of
the numerous operations conducted in conjunction with these organizations in the 1990s, there is a
general belief among civil-military planners that such coordination maximizes cost-effectiveness and
efficiency, avoids costly duplication, identifies capabilities, and avoids misunderstandings and
friction. Today, one of the first things to be done in a peacetime mission is to make or develop
relationships among these various participating groups.
Furthermore, such an “all-inclusive” strategy is valuable because it allows planners to develop a
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comprehensive and long-term plan, even though the US portion may be short. In humanitarian
demining operations, for example, “the US can plan for an end -state (e.g. hand-off to a UN mine
action center or the host nation) without taking perpetual responsibility for future actions.”124
Problems with Coordinating Demining Operations
Coordination of mine action activities is difficult. No one is totally in charge. While the host nation
may try to exercise control, there are many instances in which it is simply not capable of exercising
effective management of numerous and diverse organizations. The demining organizations
themselves: NGOs, for-profit companies, military elements, UN organizations, donor country
agencies, etc. do not always have an institutional penchant for coordination. Demining organizations
working in the host nation may come from all over the globe and reflect differences in culture,
ideology, methodology, donor accountability, and goals. And finally there is the matter of authority;
old ways die hard, and many organizations are just not ready to “take orders” from anyone else.
Given the difficulty in coordinating mine action activities, one might hope that the UN could step in
and manage country operations. However, the UN plays important roles of sponsoring demining
operations, overseeing the staffing of Mine Action Centers, monitoring demining events, and
promulgating demining standards. Some feel that the very presence of the UN may serve to
undermine the indigenous quality of a demining program, while others feel that the UN must go
further in developing more coordinated efforts. 125 If the UN were to pursue an authoritative role in a
host country, not only would there be organizations who would oppose it, but the other demining
roles played by the UN may be compromised. Therefore, in spite of the coordination problem, the
UN probably will continue to play its role as a neutral and respected arbiter of mine action programs.
Finally, we must deal with mine action as a comprehensive term which encompasses a diverse
number of activities, such as mine clearance, surveying, marking and monitoring, mine awareness,
land reduction (declaring some areas “safe”), logistics, and victim assistance. Indeed, one may say
that a typical demining NGO of today must promote “increased collaboration among all agencies” in
order to improve programmatic efficiency.126
The Conundrum: How to Coordinate When No One is In Charge
There is a general assumption that “the more agencies work together from the start, the more
coordinated the larger effort,”127 yet a demining organization may be loathe to give up any of its
autonomy. Certainly each organization is searching for its own “identified point of contact; known
funding mechanisms, geographic and program interests, etc. in their area of interest.128 Therefore,
NGOs along with Special Operations often recognize the need to identify a “program manager” in
the geographic area.
It seems then, that while experience leads most demining operators to conclude that the
establishment of a “national-level demining [program] is a task best accomplished in peacetime by a
single-purpose organization […and that a…] standard national demining authority can [not] oversee
humanitarian demining operations, as each host nation organization varies significantly based upon
its unique strengths, capabilities, and limitations.” A single-purpose organization has been suggested
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because demining “is an extremely slow, labor-intensive task that consumes an inordinate amount of
manpower,” however reality dictates that no single organization can “be in charge.”129 Therefore, the
ability to coordinate, communicate, and integrate with all viable players continues to be the best hope
for concerted and effective mine action.
The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been involved in demining because of its
skills in dealing with country-specific and cultural difficulties. Cultural difficulties are assessed
during the pre-mission survey. USSOCOM establishes religious, political, dress, and code of
conduct guidelines that are closely adhered to and based on information obtained from governing
bodies, religious leaders, documents, statutes, military leaders, police, ethnic groups, country needs,
and community needs.130 Even with good planning, a continued assessment of cultural factors is
useful. “Having a Liaison Officer in-country allows eyes on target and constant communication with
host nation as to cultural and country specifics.”131
CA and the Coordination of Demining Efforts
When coordinating within a demining context it must be understood that an interagency operation
cannot be compared to the command and control of a military mission. There is no accepted,
autonomous or unified responsibility for the whole of any demining effort. Indeed, many
organizations (for reasons both good and bad) bristle at the thought of a military authority in charge
(some NGOs equate the origins of the landmine presence with a military activity and have a difficult
time accepting military oversight). However, it is felt, and has been shown to some extent, that Army
Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) [and perhaps most especially CA forces] provide a low-key
presence that is politically acceptable and yet readily convertible to military operations. The US
Army Special Operations Command states that a “continued emphasis on joint and interagency
interoperability will be paramount for ARSOF peacetime engagement activities.”132
Application of CA capabilities range from the strategic to the tactical. Joint Staff doctrine recognizes
the need for the application of CA at each level, including support of coordination within and
between agencies and other players. JP 3-57 states that such efforts will result in, “close coordination
and cooperation with these groups [which] should reduce costs, prevent duplication, lessen the
friction of potential rivalry, and improve results.”133
Similar Applications of CA
CA personnel have, in the past, played leading roles in the planning and implementing of civilmilitary operations in Panama, Kuwait, Kurdistan, Haiti, and Bosnia. The political-military
dimension of CA has been a catalyst setting in motion the activation of many of the CA reservists,
attached to high level planning cells. Indeed, many officials in the Department of Defense and the
Department of State have come to know, and rely on this capability. During these operations, US
Army Reserve CA advisors have had “routine access to senior leaders at all levels.”134 Therefore, it is
logical to extend this application of CA skills to the planning and implementation of humanitarian
demining which calls for similar civil-military coordination, interagency planning, international
coordination, and staff augmentation. It has been suggested, for instance, that the format of
assessments may be standardized at the Interagency Working Group (IWG) level and that
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experienced CA personnel could assist with this process. 135
CA Doctrine and Coordination
Draft doctrine for humanitarian demining also recognizes the value of coordination efforts
undertaken by CA, and notes that its actions may facilitate better relations with NGOs et al.
Furthermore, it is possible that the advance work of a CA team during the site survey, might also
pave the way for frictionless clearance requirements and easier deployment of US demining forces
into the host country. This work can be done simultaneously with preparations for future integration
of effort with NGOs. CA contributes interagency, social structure, and management training expertise
to this effort, but also applies its “unique qualifications of language, cultural awareness, and area
orientation.”136
Joint CA doctrine points out that “CA forces and personnel continue to be the ‘bedrock’ that
facilitates the application of these specialized forces.”137 In such a complex demining scenario, CA
forces may indeed be a facilitating factor in the synchronizing and coordinating of planned and
recommended actions.
Other CA Coordination Roles
A key area for coordination among demining players is in the development, training, and operation of
a National Demining Office (NDO). This is a critical activity, more fully discussed in the following
section of this report.
A perennial problem arising from demining support operations is the need for greater support from
the host nation in helping to solve logistical problems, both for the program itself, and for the
support of a US team deployed to support the mission. There has been a general lack of
understanding of the countries participating in the US demining program, of the commitment
necessary to support a demining program. “Coordination with all [host nation] officials, military,
national and local, and the support of those officials is needed to support demining operations.”138 To
coordinate with a host nation in which the US government is conducting a civil-military operation, is
a traditional and often-exercised CA function.
Another challenge facing the US while participating in a demining operation, is the ability to
disengage at the proper time and conclude the mission. NGOs have been central in enabling military
forces to withdraw from CMO, such as PROVIDE COMFORT, (aid to the Kurds in the aftermath of
Operation DESERT STORM) and PROMOTE DEMOCRACY (Haiti). While most NGOs are not
centrally concerned with the needs of the US military, they are indeed interested in their own goals,
successes, and operations. CA personnel have often been able to get NGOs to see the congruence of
their activities with those of the US. By coordinating the actions of US demining personnel with the
activities of the NGOs, CA operators can help empower the NGOs to achieve their goals, while
monitoring hand-off and transition milestones for US military forces.139
As an example, CA coordination was identified as a key to the success of PROVIDE COMFORT by
assuring that integrated civilian and military management structures were formed with representation
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from the military forces and civilian government agencies from several nations, international
governmental or quasi-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations.140
Limitations of CA Coordination Support
Planners of a demining program, however, must take care not to rely too heavily on CA expertise,
allowing those forces to usurp the authority of the commander, country team or host nation.
“Activities of CA forces should be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison,
and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous
resources should be made consistent with satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.141”
CA team leaders must be imbued with the fact that they are the eyes and ears of the commander, and
are not decision-makers, unless specifically delegated with such power.
Conversely, because of the above-mentioned concern, US military doctrine stresses the ability of CA
forces actively to integrate the actions of other organizations and agencies into CMO. There has been
reluctance among military planners and commanders to exercise this application rigorously or
consistently. “CA teams or task forces have rarely moved far beyond the rudimentary concept of
interagency cooperation.”142

4.

Training and Management

Given the comprehensive nature of demining, there are numerous times when management,
leadership, and training skills need to be applied to host nation needs. Demining guidance lists
leadership, record keeping, database skills, computer knowledge, staff organization, and conducting
training exercises as capabilities which CA forces may help the host nation develop.143
One of the greatest challenges in demining is to train indigenous personnel how to manage the
comprehensive national or local program. If there is to be an indigenous demining program, there has
to be leadership for it. That leadership may have to be developed “from the ground up” and may
entail management training along with education about mines. Just as ‘train-the-trainer’ activities
occur before operations, so must management training. Often, countries with serious demining
problems also have functional, infrastructure, and management problems which make this training
all the more critical.
One outspoken demining operator has pointed out that, “The office side of humanitarian demining is
always weak. It has always been weak. The field side is good. The management for mine clearance
operations is very normal everyday basic civilian skills, [while] technological knowledge of mine
clearance is absolutely irrelevant...”144
CA assistance therefore, can focus on “…training leadership skills, management techniques”145 and
staff procedures so that “…the management hierarchy of the host nation demining office can assume
greater control of its subordinate organizations and of the problem [the landmine threat] itself.”146
Since CA is often charged with performing activities and functions normally the responsibility of
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local government, it is expected to maintain management and administrative training skills. The
application of these skills has been undertaken as a result of recent operations in Panama (police
training) and Haiti (judicial training). The problem is that training host nation personnel effectively
usually assumes a long-term commitment, while US policy aims at a short US military presence.147

5.

The National Demining Office

The Importance of the National Demining Office
One aspect of demining which has become axiomatic is the need for a central, coordinating office to
manage and oversee the demining efforts of a nation, province, or district at risk from the landmine
threat. Whether it is called a Mine Action Center (MAC) or a National Demining Office (NDO), it
not only provides the “home” for demining management, prioritization, record keeping, and liaison,
but also becomes a direct manifestation of the host nation’s willingness to devote time, focus, and
resources to the demining program.
An NDO is the appropriate office for coordinating all actions of a mine action campaign, including
the efforts of the US government and NGOs. “Coordination and liaison with all involved agencies
and government [is necessary] to maintain sustainability of a trained demining organization.”148 It
should coordinate component activities of the demining effort with a view to sustaining those efforts
when the US (and other demining players) re-deploys. US assistance in developing an NDO can be
crucial because, as a reflection of host nation resolve and commitment, it may determine the fate of
the program.
An NDO is ideally responsible for planning, integrating, and prioritizing the country’s demining
effort. “Components of the national HQ include safety and quality-assurance officers (who report
directly to the director), as well as liaison officers (LNO) from other national entities and related
agencies, such as NGOs.” 149 Also, part of an NDO typically includes command, administrative, data
management, historical research, operations and training, and logistics sections150.
The ability of an NDO to prioritize effectively efforts depends on knowing and monitoring areas of
suspected or proven infestation.151 As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
noted, because the “urgent situations are most often to be found in the communities and provinces” a
mine information system for prioritizing efforts “is first and foremost a local, pragmatic, in-country
mechanism. By standardizing the flow and analysis of data within a country, needs and constraints
are more readily identified, coordination among the various actors is enhanced, the establishment of
operational priorities facilitated and the overall effectiveness of mine action increased.”152
An NDO, then is at the heart of mine action when mine action is understood as a broad public health
and developmental issue. Pragmatically, the mine problems are local, but the resources for
addressing mine problems often are not, and national socio-economic concerns may need a NDO to
direct the demining efforts. Many factors such as the national government’s structure, its ability to
control its provinces, the extent of the landmine problems, availability of managers with skill and
ambition, etc. can influence the role that a NDO can play in the demining effort.
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NGOs and the National Demining Office
Demining NGOs generally have reached the point where they believe that despite institutional and
national differences, coordination of effort is necessary for the mine action program to be most
effective.153 The beginning point for concerted action (from a NGO perspective) is having an
identified place where funding, planning, prioritization, programmatic, and demographic issues are
coordinated.154 The NGOs, as well as the US military element supporting demining operations,
would therefore like to deal with a clearly identified and authoritative program manager.
NGOs may be reluctant to request help, or even coordination, from military organizations or
commercial businesses; they are more likely to respond to requests from an NDO based on their
understanding of the mine problem and their organizational philosophy.155Therefore, there is an
almost universal desire to see the establishment of an effective NDO. An effective NDO allows host
nation to solicit assistance more confidently, organizations of all stripes to be more receptive, and
alleviates suspicion that an outside organization may be controlling the situation. If the host nation
says, “we’ve got a demining program set up here, what kind of help can you give us? The NGOs and
PVOs are more apt to jump in and say okay. Everything has to be seen as a concerted effort;
everything has got to support the national objective”.156
Consequently, the degree to which a host nation can maintain an effective, independent NDO
depends on its political strength—its legitimacy, trustworthiness, and stability. Even proxy
management requires the cooperation of the host nation. This cooperation needs to be fostered and
cultivated. The objectives of the host nation must be understood in the proper context and demining
activities must be effective in order to maintain support of the citizenry.157
The US and the National Demining Office
As stated above, the US has reason to desire the creation of an NDO in the host nation. An NDO is
the appropriate focal point for coordinating US government and NGO activities—it must assume the
responsibility for sustaining the demining effort after the US government’s train-the-trainer program
ends. US assistance in developing an NDO is crucial because the office and host nation support for
the program will determine the fate of the effort. Coordination and liaison with all agencies and
relevant government agencies is needed to maintain sustainability “of a trained demining
organization.”158
A functioning NDO is normally the best way to assure the success of the US exit strategy. Having an
organized NDO coordinating all mine action activities and schedules allows the exit strategy to
unfold, by preparing other organizations to take over after US mine action activities are completed.159
The transition, however, is not automatic. Those overseeing the establishment of the NDO must
monitor the situation and implement plans according to milestone achievements or transition
points.160 An NDO is also the appropriate office for “coordinating US government and NGO
activities.”161 NGOs have years of experience in the countries and possess locally hired staff;162 their
expertise should be recognized and coordination with those agencies cultivated within the context of
an NDO. Without a sustainable NDO, some NGOs undoubtedly will continue to operate, as they
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have operated in the past—though without the benefit of a coordinated effort. This long-term NGO
commitment is one solution to a problem identified by some in the US military. The problem is
achieving a balance between “teaching and providing equipment to host nation, while it assumes
responsibility for the program.”163
CA and the National Demining Office
In conception, operation, and goals, NDOs are remarkably similar to Civilian Military Coordination
Centers (CMOC): organizations described in recent CA doctrine and activated in such CMOs as
PROMOTE LIBERTY (Panama), RESTORE DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and in Bosnia. These CMOCs
have fostered coordination, communication, and collaboration among various civil-military
organizations, and have created a method for allowing civilian and military plans to be integrated and
de-conflicted.
CA soldiers have operated within CMOCs and have been trained to act as liaison officers within
them, performing coordinating, monitoring, and integrating functions with organizations “outside the
wire.” Having a talented liaison officer (LNO) in-country allows for maximum flexibility to establish
reliable “real-time” communication with the host nation and other involved organizations.164
CA support then, in an NDO context, allows the US military to coordinate with all demining
organizations in a geographic area, coordinate operational efforts (such as train-the-trainer, mine
action, and medical assistance or training), support the host nation, leverage complimentary actions,
and plan for transition and hand-off milestones.

6.

Measures of Effectiveness

One of the most critical elements in the entire process of implementing a successful mine action plan
is determining the measures of effectiveness (MOE). Donors have driven this concern; those who
financially support demining operations expect some evidence of success. This concern for
accountability appropriately focuses attention on the purpose of the demining and priorities.
More and more, donors, supporting agencies, host nations, and especially the demining operators
themselves, are concerned with establishing a definition of mine action success and a means for
measuring such. In order to assess progress in operations, plan transitions, establish end state goals,
and design a host nation-run sustainable program; goals and objectives must reflect desired
outcomes. These outcomes must be objectively assessed and should make some claim to be viable.
What is the right measure of effectiveness for a demining program? While there is no single answer,
the common ones such as, number of square meters cleared and decline in mortality rates and other
indicators, do provide quantifiable data. Donors expect that their donations will make a difference
and there is the sense that “if you give a million dollars to help remove mines there should be some
discernible difference.”165
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The Evolution of Demining MOE
Inevitably the first measures of success, based on the number of mines (or unexploded ordnance)
removed or destroyed, were the easiest to measure and to report. However, demining agencies
quickly determined that the amount of land cleared was a greater indication of success. Yet this
measure too, was quickly relegated to secondary consideration, when the same agencies observed
that the amount of productive or key land returned to use was more important than the aggregate
number of acres cleared.
Currently, it is considered more important to relate mine action goals to drops in mortality and
casualty rates, public confidence, freedom of movement, resettlement of displaced persons, a
recovering economy, opened schools, and land under cultivation,166 than listing pounds of ordnance
cleared. One of the most effective and respected of landmine operators Hendrik Ehlers of MgM, at a
global demining conference told his audience that in the last analysis, his measure of success was,
“…the smiles which he now sees on the faces of the people in Angola.”167
A large number of people in the global demining community now agrees that measures of
effectiveness are multi-faceted. They declare that the “other” two pillars of mine action (mine
awareness, and victim assistance) can have an immensely important impact on the success of a mine
action campaign, and can sometimes claim parity with mine clearance for effectiveness.
The Difficulties in Determining MOE
One problem with determining the effectiveness of a mine action program is dealing with
“measures” that are not measurable in the conventional sense. Someone who is a subject matter
expert must some how develop criteria for measuring effectiveness (success) from results which are
not always conducive to numerical interpretation. While the socio-economic impact of mine action
operations cannot be empirically measured, it is nevertheless important to develop a methodology
that tries to refine and improve this process. It may be counterproductive to claim that one set of
measures is either more relevant than, or superior in other ways, to another set, but discussions of
such, based on the experience of demining organizations remain important as they contribute to a
body of knowledge on this subject. This facilitates a more methodical and effective way to organize
and codify procedures and results.168
Civil Affairs and MOE
During the past fifteen years, CA doctrine has undergone innovative changes almost continuously.
One of the most creative and timely is the subject which humanitarian demining agencies have been
dealing with –MOE.
As described in Section III of this paper, Joint Civil Affairs doctrine places the subject of MOE at the
very heart of civil-military operations, requiring CA planners and operators to be familiar with the
requirements and importance of that mission.169 MOE guidelines and parameters are discussed in
various CA doctrines and “think” pieces, which could be applied to humanitarian demining MOE
challenges. Further, CA officers have been trained to apply their expertise (civilian professional
functional specialties) to the overarching concept of reconstitution, restoration, or reconstruction. In
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this way they are expected to contribute to the whole of the national fabric in order to assure the
overall infrastructure of success. To a large degree, this is what the relatively new dynamic of
humanitarian demining is developing: a way to define and recognize overall success from a series of
monitored actions and milestones.

7.

Infrastructure Restoration

Demining As A Precursor to Development
As noted previously, the landmine threat increasingly is seen as part of the developmental challenge
facing a country, rather than as an isolated problem. Many affected countries are facing incredible
infrastructure, governance, societal, and health problems, in part because they are incurring demining
accidents. Many have come to realize that other health risks, displaced civilian problems, market ills,
and agricultural disasters are created or at least exacerbated by the landmine threat. The World Bank,
for instance, notes that, “Mine pollution affects the comparative expense and value of differing
strategies for repair of roads and infrastructure, rehabilitating agricultural production and other areas
of reconstruction.”170 While (or perhaps, because) landmines are a very discrete and identifiable
threat, they were, as a relatively new phenomena, treated as an isolated threat, rather than one whose
effects – and remedies – cut across societal boundaries.
Today, the trend is to treat the mine threat as one of a series of basic developmental challenges,
which must be approached in an integrated way. For example, at first it was thought that landmine
victims needed special clinics and health care; recent thought however, accepts that landmine victims
have many of the same problems as auto accident victims, people who have suffered debilitating
diseases, etc.171
The Requirements for Infrastructure Support
Demining operators face two levels of infrastructure challenges. First, a US deployment must have
its own logistical base and infrastructure. Without a logistical, communication, and subsistence
“tail,” the military demining support team will be ineffective; especially in a country with a primitive
support infrastructure.
Secondly, is the need to identify, develop, integrate, or recreate those infrastructure activities, which
will both facilitate the demining effort, and link the benefits of mine action to the restoration of
aspects of normal living (e.g. the clearing of farm lands, the relocation of displaced civilians, the
establishment of markets, the re-opening of schools, etc.). The role of the US military in this effort
(normally, short-term) must be clearly understood by both the host nation and US forces, ensuring
effective transition of infrastructure responsibilities to other organizations which will perform
sustained long-term operations in-country.172
CA in Support of US Demining Deployments
One lesson learned from recent demining operations is that, “the host nation does not typically
understand the planning, logistics, and other support necessary for the demining program to
succeed.”173 Indeed the general lack of logistical and infrastructure support often results in the
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deployed demining organizations performing such rudimentary work as the digging of wells and
providing for sewage—and then facing a power struggle to keep the facilities for the demining
team.174
A central CA doctrinal mission is to identify resources such as funding, personnel, and equipment,
logistic support systems (e.g. transportation) for military operations. Of course the logistics and
support requirements are driven by the availability of host nation resources, and by the “nature and
extent of the mine and UXO problem.”175 CA participation in the national assessment and the site
survey can help determine sources (or the need for) such support.
CA in Support of Reconstituting the Host Nation Infrastructure
CA has engaged in numerous infrastructure restoration efforts since 1983. In doing so it has
addressed virtually all of the functional specialties required by basic CA doctrine. In each case the
task of CA has been to tailor the infrastructure needs of the host nation to that which could be
rendered by the US. In Panama, for instance, CA personnel determined that police training and
financial systems restoration were needed most. Likewise, restoring the electrical grid and fire
fighting capabilities in Kuwait; the judicial system in Haiti; the restoration of clan and family support
systems in Kurdistan; and the movement of displaced civilians in Kosovo.
CA is often called upon by the CINCs to apply its knowledge of functional specialties in order to
facilitate obtaining or creating the necessary support. Sometimes that has meant direct consultancy
by CA specialists with host nation counterparts, other times it has meant that CA identify the sources
of required goods or services. CA units and individual personnel have been particularly noticed and
awarded for performing such activities. CA soldiers have become especially adept at brokering and
linking funds, personnel, and equipment to the task and at processing requirements for [support]
contracts such as in Kuwait and Sarajevo.176
CA, therefore can help develop a comprehensive approach for integrating equipment, technical data,
and support into the host nation humanitarian demining program. CA can also help identify, select,
and support the transfer of equipment and information to the host nation (ideally through the
National Demining Office). Furthermore, CA personnel can select and support global, technical, and
operational databases, and oversee the effective transfer of information and equipment to the host
nation, US agencies, the UN, NGOs, and private sector organizations. CA could help effect “the link
between mine clearance and economic development …maximized by closer cooperation among US
government agencies throughout the process.”177
CA can support demining activities by working with host nation agencies that are concerned with
infrastructure matters and with encouraging people at the community level to work together on small
projects. These kinds of activities will not only help integrate demining activities into the host
nation’s developmental plans, but will “encourage economic activity, stability, and the growth of
national infrastructure.”178
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CA Infrastructure Support – A Short Term Solution
A danger inherent to CA teams performing infrastructure support activities, is that the host nation, or
other agencies may come to rely on it for long-term solutions. The host nation or a recognized
surrogate must predicate long-term sustainability and follow-up assessment plans on the maintenance
of the program. US civil-military operations can assist by helping to establish a foundation for these
in the short term; however, they cannot maintain a long-term sustainability effort, which is more
suited for NGO or PVO support, possibly funded and monitored by the US country team.179
The long-term commitment of the NGOs, Mine Action Centers overseen by the UN, and other
organizations allows them to engage more completely in developing individual leadership skills,
community based organizational development, and nation building than is possible – or desirable with the DOD demining program. NGOs want to develop “community based organizations that
complement government and UN activities.”180 From their perspective, what is needed is the
“integration of demining activities into development work when applicable. This is most suitable for
NGO support.181
A major problem, however, is that, “demining organizations are attempting to do development work,
but do not possess the skills or assets to do so.”182 Therefore, the CA support to this process, done
while facilitating the establishment of the US military demining effort, seems to be a productive,
timely, and appropriate, as well as doctrinally sound application of CA.

8.

Exit Strategy: Transition to Host Nation Sustainment

The Goal: Building Indigenous Capacity
In many post-Cold War operations, selecting the moment to end US military participation has proven
to be a tricky business. In essence, senior leadership must define success outside the realm of normal
combat operations. We have investigated the phenomena of success - that is, determining and
applying measures of effectiveness in demining operations - earlier in this section. However, there
must be more attention paid to the specific process of planning and preparing for the end of a
humanitarian demining operation.
Virtually all demining organizations agree that building an indigenous capability is the ultimate aim
of demining support. The best guarantee for sustaining a demining operation is the ability and
willingness of the host nation to support the program. That commitment to a national effort is all but
required to maintain coordination and linkage among the NGOs. Therefore, there is a need to
determine how to integrate the activities of a US humanitarian demining effort into a viable host
nation effort, which offers the best chance to continue and sustain it. To put it simply, the host nation
(or a recognized surrogate) should assume ownership of the program.
General criteria for termination or transition includes, achieving previously determined milestone
events, arriving at agreed-to measures of effectiveness, assessing the availability of resources, and
establishing key or specific dates.183 Consequently, as the US “hands-off” its demining activities to
the host nation, it must be confident of the real abilities and liabilities of the host nation. There may
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be others there to help, most notably UN agencies and NGOs, but US forces should be clear as to
which activities are the purview of the host nation, and which are under the rubric of others. It is
reasonable to expect that a nation will not “go it alone”, but will accept help from NGOs, the country
team, the UN, regional players, contractors, donors and others.
Continuous Planning
One way to reach and control the difficult concept of “hand-off” is to plan early for it. The planning,
with all of its difficulties, needs to anticipate the desired end-state, including provisions for outside
support, if necessary, to continue the program. This involves anticipating some way to incorporate
NGOs. The US and the host nation should agree on the End State at the very beginning, i.e. during
the country assessment.
Detailed plans have been found to “greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition.
Typically, “termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the
deployment plan.”184 Because the transition may involve the UN and NGOs, it needs full and
continuous coordination with all involved organizations. Each transfer of control will be
situationally dependent, and each plan will have different requirements.185 The transition entails the
transfer of active projects and coordination, points of contacts, possible resources and any additional
information that may facilitate the transition.186 A comprehensive transition plan includes, “specific
requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and
assigns specific responsibilities.”187
A checklist for termination planning should address the following questions:188
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Has the End State been achieved?
Have stated operations objectives been accomplished?
Have pre-existing national systemic obstacles to demining been addressed?
Has the commander identified redeployment requirements?
Has coordination for redeployment been conducted with appropriate commands,
agencies, and other organizations?
Has consideration been given as to when Reserve component forces will be
released?
Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are
transitioning to another military, regional or United Nations, or civilian
organization?
What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish
demining activities?

A clear End State of the DOD demining training program, measures of effectiveness, and DOD exit
strategy must be established at the very beginning in the DoS policy assessment process. The
assessment team must look at its task in two ways: the short-term US military objectives and the
long-term US sustainability plan. They must be clearly understood by both the host nation and US
forces to ensure effective transition of responsibilities, from the establishment of basic infrastructure
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to sustained long-term operations in-country. A long-term sustainability and follow-up assessment
plan increases the likelihood the host nation will maintain the program. Military programs can assist
and establish a foundation in the short term, however, they should not maintain a long-term
sustainment effort that is more suited for NGOs or other support, possibly with US funding and
monitoring by the US country team.189
Creating an indigenous, sustainable demining program is usually not easy, because many at-risk
countries do not have the capabilities, resources, and commitment to succeed. While it is tempting to
require US forces simply to coordinate with the National Demining Office (NDO) in order to handoff responsibilities and activities; common sense and a realistic appraisal of the multiple challenges
faced by threatened nations, leads us to the conclusion that a nascent national demining organization
is usually incapable of solving complex landmine related problems effectively. Also, methods used to
achieve success in one nation do not guarantee success in another. Therefore each program must be
tailored to a specific nation’s capacity to support a demining program, and a realistic appraisal should
be made. Pertinent transition questions include:190
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Who determines when the transition begins and/or is complete?
Who funds the transition?
Which US forces, equipment, supplies, and resources will remain behind?
Who will support US forces that remain behind?
Can incoming forces and organizations share intelligence?
Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?
Will the United States be expected to provide communications or logistical
capabilities to the incoming force or organization?

The CA Role in Planning and Coordinating the Exit Strategy
Just as Civil Affairs personnel can help plan and coordinate various social, economic, and political
aspects of demining operations, they can appraise the same elements to help plan the transition and
exit strategy. Indeed, “termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with
the deployment plan.”191 Since CA activities ultimately are directed toward achieving “an orderly and
prompt transition of civilian sector responsibilities from the DOD Components to non-DOD
authorities,” planning and support of the transition and exit strategy are direct applications of core
competencies. 192 They can also appraise and analyze approved measures of effectiveness to track,
monitor, and gauge relevant developmental milestones.
CA forces are also cognizant of NGO and other demining organizations’ roles, having coordinated
their efforts throughout the deployment and implementation phases. Since NGOs will probably
continue to enable military forces to withdraw from demining operations, CA staff can work to
achieve voluntary cooperation among participants during transition stages. By “…coordinating the
availability of agency services with the needs of the population, CA operators empower the NGOs to
achieve their goals.” The CA teams thereby fulfill their role as facilitators.193
Since the departing US team should introduce the host nation demining leadership to US personnel
56

who will “monitor the long-term sustainment objectives,” and conduct a post-mission evaluation
prior to redeployment, 194 CA liaison officers may be useful. The theater Special Operations
Commander may request further training as is “required to sustain the host nation program. The
departing CA team should provide specific recommendations to modify the theater CINC
sustainment plan regarding funding, training, maintenance support, and supply requirements.”195
As JP 3-57 notes, a successful exit strategy is facilitated by successes in operational and tactical level
activities.196 Changed or unforeseen political conditions, however, may necessitate changes to the
exit strategy. As with other CMO, the termination or transition occurs “when either the mission has
been accomplished or when the National Command Authority so directs.”197 The program
evaluation is continual and comprehensive, encompassing all phases, including the exit strategy.
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Section VI – Constraints, Variables, and Opportunities
Thus far this report has dealt with requirements, capabilities, and applications. In so doing, it has
attempted to show congruencies, which exist within the universe of humanitarian demining and US
Army Civil Affairs forces. But the simple matching of capabilities to requirements is a sterile
exercise if it does not take into account other “real-world” influences. It is the purpose of this section
of the report to analyze those factors.

1.

National Security Policy and Humanitarian Demining Guidance

The Importance of Humanitarian Demining
The humanitarian demining program is not a national security issue, which touches upon vital or
even strategic national interests. As such, few would argue that it should be pursued within the DOD
at the expense of war fighting capabilities. General Shalikashvili, no stranger to humanitarian
missions, has cautioned that the Defense Department should “…focus on its war-fighting
missions…DOD is judged on its ability to win war, not by how many hectares of foreign soil have
been cleared.”198
Nevertheless, there seems to be enough potentially valuable benefits of the program to warrant
making it a significant part of the regional commanders’ peacetime engagement strategy. Former
Secretary of Defense Perry, when giving directions for the implementation of the humanitarian
demining program, called for the Department of Defense to, “…significantly expand its humanitarian
assistance to train and assist other countries in developing effective demining programs.”199 At the
conclusion of the instruction memo (to agencies within his department), Secretary Perry himself
alluded to this challenge when he concluded that, “The new policy on anti-personnel landmines
strikes an important balance between military and humanitarian purposes.”200 Therefore, there
exists a healthy tension, not only within the Department of Defense, but also among various US
government entities, as to the proper role and level of American participation in the demining
program. [Note: the portion of this section dealing with Congressional funding demonstrates the
dichotomy among Senate and House members on this issue.]
Demining, of course, is not the only civil-military or humanitarian mission undergoing policy
development. Since the end of the Cold War, the US military (particularly the Army) has been
involved in almost constant redefinition of roles and goals. The trend of such policy reviews;
however, has been to support a major peacetime engagement “plank” in national security policy. In
various forms, it has been asserted that the peacetime engagement of the US military is not only
appropriate, but of significant value in preserving regional stability, while allowing for a costeffective and constructive way of preparing for possible war fighting scenarios.
Demining, however, brings together many other characteristics, which are even more complex and
less in tune with US traditional military planning. Some characteristics of demining (e.g. no one
being “in-charge” of some mine action programs, NGOs exercising operational authority, the
inclusion of “for-profit” demining organizations, various participating levels of UN organizations,
61

and the intangible effects of having the US position on the anti-personnel landmine treaty [the
“Ottawa Treaty”] brought into the issue); have singled demining out as a special case of US
humanitarian assistance missions.
Support for Humanitarian Demining
It is important then, to consider the dynamics and consequences of the development of this aspect of
national security policy. Many US government leaders support the demining program because it is
basically humanitarian. But there are others who approve of it because it promises to alleviate causes
of instability, and others who endorse it because it provides US military personnel participation with
appropriate training and readiness opportunities. Then of course, there are those in Congress (and
elsewhere) who believe that US military participation in humanitarian demining is an inappropriate
application of scarce war fighting capabilities. There are, therefore, four general sets of opinions as to
the correct application of US forces in a humanitarian demining operation, and these perceptions
have given rise to a diverse and complex set of opinions –and authorities –involved in the oversight
of US participation in this effort.
The result of the differences of opinion - as well as the normal challenges inherent in initiating a new
civil-military program (beginning in 1994) - have given rise to a continual reexamination of the
funding, training, equipping, budgeting, and deployment parameters of the US military demining
program. Of course, CA is not the only component of the DOD demining program, which has
experienced uncertainty. However, the focus of this report is on CA, which has (observed or
unobserved) been affected by the evolution of the humanitarian demining policy, a development
exacerbated by CA’s own institutional and doctrinal turbulence. [See below.]
Demining and the CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plans
Even though humanitarian demining has brought with it a number of new challenges, the regional
commanders-in-chief (CINC) have generally embraced it as one of the interlocking activities which
can help make up the entire fabric of their Theater Engagement Plans. Humanitarian Demining has
been placed within the family of military humanitarian operations, which is governed by the
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) (appropriation).201
However, implementing this program has not been easy for the CINCs. Not only have there been
normal growing pains, which come with any new program, but also various Congressional and
funding impacts on the program have resulted in an inconsistent approach to implementing it. For
instance, 10 U.S.C. §401, has been variously interpreted and changed with respect to the limits of
types and costs of equipment that can be left behind with the host nation after US trainers have
departed.202 On balance, however, the greatest challenges to implementing CINC-level demining
operations, are that landmine problems, which usually lie at the heart of host nation development and
health problems, are invariably country and scenario specific, and therefore lend themselves to caseby-case solutions.
Differences in CINCs’ Demining Operations
The lack of standardization means that the responsibility rests with the geographic command for
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creative management, “scrambling around at the CINC level trying to figure out how you’re going to
get a widget in the country.”203 Complicating this challenge is the fact that the humanitarian
demining budget is separate from exercise funding,204 even though both serve the military purpose of
honing operational skills during peacetime. Standardization, some think, needs to be “across the
board at the CINC level…how we do business, how we get equipment, how we get trainers in
countries should be the same.”205
On the other hand, CINCs have created demining Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) which are
“fairly definitive” but which “may vary vastly if [taken] to Angola or Cambodia.”206 Moreover, there
is the difficulty of trying to standardize procedures for countries, which have totally different needs,
culture, or climate. The fact that there are differences among the geographic commands in
developing demining procedures does not mean that the Special Operations Commands (SOC) are
disengaged. It means, to the contrary, that the SOC is engaged for execution and training to support
the CINC’s objectives and is taking host nation and local operational characteristics into account.207
Accounting for these differences lies at the very heart of what makes Special Operations, special.
Over zealous development of SOPs can be counterproductive, stifling flexibility, creating red tape,
and hindering rather than facilitating implementation of US policy. “Even procedures based on
extensive experience cannot replace sound judgment. Situations vary. Standards applied across the
board may unnecessarily restrict operators.”208
Demining “Doctrine”
Perhaps nothing reflects the “neither…nor” characterization of humanitarian demining as a DOD
activity than the development and status of operational guidance. For, while the mission orientation
is directly applicable to the capabilities of Army Special Operations Forces, there exists no official
doctrine.209 The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has prepared the Humanitarian
Demining Operations Handbook under the proponency of the Training and Doctrine Command. This
publication provides information and guidance on conducting demining operations, and was
submitted for qualification as a field manual but was not so categorized because humanitarian
demining has not been recognized as an Army mission.
However, since the CINCs are expected to conduct humanitarian demining activities as part of their
Theater Engagement Plans, the Joint Staff has prepared “near-doctrine” when it issued the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3207.01 (1 March 1999), Military Support to Humanitarian
Demining Operations.

2.

Civil Affairs – Perceptions and Reality

CA a Unique Army Capability
Only one branch of the US Army is solely in the US Army Reserves: Civil Affairs. The reason for
this is that the capabilities necessary at the higher skill levels of CA are not trained or cultivated in
the Active Component; they are civilian-acquired, professional skills. [See Section 3.] Rank in these
units is higher per number of soldiers than any other branch, and Military Occupational Specialty
(MOS) qualification is more difficult to recruit, qualify and quantify than more traditional military or
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combat skills. The average age of the CA soldier is higher because the requirement for high level
civil-military tasks demands more maturity, flexibility, and professional achievement.
What have these differences meant to CA as its practitioners are trained to support US military
objectives? First, CA has been the most utilized of all USAR capabilities over the past fifteen years.
Civil Affairs units or teams have participated in operations: JUST CAUSE (Panama); PROMOTE
LIBERTY (Panama); DESERT SHIELD (Kuwait); DESERT STORM (Kuwait); PROVIDE
COMFORT (Turkey and Iraq); Guantanamo I; PROVIDE RELIEF (Hurricane Response);
RESTORE HOPE (Somalia); PROVIDE PROMISE (Yugoslavia); CONTINUE HOPE (Somalia);
PROVIDE RELIEF (Rwanda); UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti); MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY
(Haiti); Guantanamo II; JOINT ENDEAVOR (Yugoslavia); JOINT GUARD (Yugoslavia); JOINT
FORCE (Bosnia), and JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo). For seven of these operations, CA reservists
were mobilized under conditions other than voluntary; a situation encountered only six times
previously in the twentieth century.
Activated CA soldiers deal with a multitude of civil-military challenges, including processing
refugees, advising senior military and political leaders, restoring national infrastructure, providing
basic necessities to host nation civilians, supporting disaster relief operations, conducting civic
action projects, setting up Civil Military Operations Centers, and minimizing civilian interference
with US or combined military operations. Reserve CA units are now entering for their ninth rotation
into Bosnia and have recently processed over a half million refugees in Kosovo helping them to
return to their homes.
Uncertainties Concerning the Employment of Reserve CA Assets
A defining moment for CA occurred during the refugee operations in Kurdistan in the wake of
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD. CA staffing was identified as key to the success of the relief effort
– OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT - in which the CA task force integrated civilian and military
activities, formed organizations with representation from the military forces of several nations,
integrated the work of civilian government agencies from several nations, and worked with
international governmental, quasi-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations.
Despite general agreement on the need and the mission, CA participation did not come easily.210
Virtually every time a US Army Reserve (USAR) CA unit has been force-listed, or planned to
support an operation, it has been slowed in its assignment or deployment because of military and
civilian leaders, who did not know – or did not have confidence in - the roles, doctrine, and
capabilities of the Reserve CA force. As a result, in numerous operations, CA has been activated in
forms, which have deviated significantly from its doctrinal, war fighting, and training standards. CA
elements, have been deployed without their commanders, been placed in temporary command of an
Air Force staff officer and a Navy Admiral, had units placed under the command of other branch
Active Duty officers, or been given missions unrelated to CA capabilities.
This has happened for several reasons. One reason is that the CA force, being small and in the
USAR, has not entered the common working vernacular of many civilian and military organizations.
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Even within the USAR, CA was until recently, classified with history detachments and band units, in
the lowest level of authorized over strength allowed. Secondly, when Americans are mobilized for
deployment, there has been an overriding concern for safety and efficiency; there have been those
who have felt that the older USAR CA soldiers were not considered as sustainable or as dependable
in austere or hostile situations as AC soldiers.
Thirdly, it was feared that with its suspected “outside the box” and civilian attitudes, that CA soldiers
would not understand, or would flaunt, Regular Army doctrine, hierarchy, and authority.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, planners and commanders generally have been reluctant to
rely on CA reservists to apply capabilities, which the commander did not understand, to key and
sensitive tasks within an area as potentially volatile as the a foreign national.
Special Forces and Active Component Civil Affairs Activities
Special Forces (SF) soldiers are selected and trained to bring language and cultural knowledge to
bear on their missions. They are creative problem solvers whose flexibility and cross training in
several of the military arts, make them very effective in dealing with partisans or host nation
contacts. As such they are trained to conduct basic CA missions. Many SF soldiers are at some time
assigned to the Army’s only AC CA unit, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. Thus SF and active duty
CA soldiers are prepared to conduct rudimentary CA activities until reserve CA elements are
deployed, or in their absence, until the mission is completed.
Since USAR deployments have, in the past, been delayed or modified, SF and active duty CA
personnel have simply accomplished CA tasks in the absence of the reservists. This condition is
perhaps even more prevalent in demining operations in which SF troops are already deployed as
trainers. This has become the pattern in US demining programs; SF and 96th Battalion personnel
often perform coordination and liaison duties which ordinarily (that is, in a mobilization scenario)
would be the purview of reserve CA personnel. However, in many instances, advanced or complex
coordination and advisory activities which CA reservists would perform, are simply not conducted.
CA Doctrine - Background
For many years after World War II, Civil Affairs continued as an extension of its activities during that
conflict; that is, CA was seen as “military government.” While the Cold War developed, and
especially as it was winding down, CA was viewed by many leaders (both in and out of the military)
as an anachronism. It was during that era that CA was relegated to the “back burner” of the Army and
Reserve unit types.
While some officials sought to eliminate the capability, others sought to modify its mission to make
it more pertinent to the post-World War II era, and then the post-Cold War era. They argued that the
application of professional infrastructure and administrative skills was still a valuable tool for the
commander, for as has been pointed out, it is a rare military operation, which does not have to
consider the impact of civilians on its mission.
In the mid-80’s two events further stimulated and framed the development of CA’s future. One was
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that the very spirited debate among Army leaders over the fate of CA resulted in the cutting, but not
the elimination of the CA reserve force. The other was the 1983 rescue operation in Grenada, which
made critical use of active duty and reserve CA forces. The Army Training and Doctrine Command
took notice of both developments and began an energetic effort to redesign USAR CA units and to
rewrite its doctrine based on the emerging family of operations other than war, as well as
conventional war fighting support. [Note: The section on accessibility will address unit design.]
CA Doctrine – Recent Development
Therefore, CA doctrine in both the Army (FM 41-10) and the Joint Staff (JP 3-57) was written using
both war fighting and peacetime operations as frames of reference. Often the doctrine attempts to
cover these separate scenarios with identical guidelines. They have been in a state of almost constant
modification ever since. [Note: As this paper is being written, both documents are undergoing
another revision.] The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which sets the parameters of CINCs’ forces
and plans added a separate annex for CA, and war planners were required to complete a civil affairs
annex for every plan. Civil Affairs, it would seem, had re-entered the military lexicon, but was still
suffering from the nebulous nature of its mission.
If CA doctrine has not always made guidance to the commanders and to its practitioners clear, it is
no wonder. First of all, CA deals with an issue which is difficult to quantify or to gauge; the sum of
the spirit, morale, stability, humor, friendliness, and nature of an indigenous people. Secondly, CA
has been caught up in the same great national security questions of the 80s and 90s which the
Services writ large, have been wrestling with, e.g. What role does Low Intensity Conflict play in US
military plans? What elements should our peacetime engagement strategy contain? How do we
perform operations other than war?
The conduct of CA activities encompasses two broad functions: (1) Those activities of a commander
that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities,
both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile
area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives;
and (2) Those activities that provide specialized CA advice to US military commanders, U.S.
government departments and agencies, local governments, allied or coalition forces, and nongovernmental or other organizations.211 Therefore CA officers may expect to either conduct civilmilitary operations or act as advisors. As noted in Civil Affairs into the 21st Century, the definition
does not distinguish the active “doer” role from the more strategic advisory role.212
Difficulties of Implementing CA Doctrine
In spite of the fact that the development of CA doctrine has taken great strides forward and is very
helpful and illuminating, it still presents the CA soldier, and his operational commander, with a
double conundrum. CA personnel, must master scenarios which entail the complex, sensitive, and
high-level world politico-military situations; while simultaneously deriving its mission role (advisor,
operator, support) and organization from discussions with the commander. This process has
invariably led to an awkward “negotiating” phase in the formative stage of an operation – a time
when a commander can ill afford to lose time and focus. The resultant organizations have rarely
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maximized CA effectiveness, although they have allowed for CA capabilities to be deployed and to
begin operations. In addition to civil-military missions that arise out of “normal” military operations
are the activities that occur when “directed, in the absence of military operations.” This caveat
serves to make the definition of CA open ended, if not circular, by defining Civil Affairs as whatever
CA does when directed, which does not give a commander firm guidance about the best, or even
legal, use of CA assets.213
An operational or task force commander may find himself confused when discovering that a CA
element has been added to their assets. In addition to having a reserve team with a plethora of
civilian skills thrust upon him, he, depending on his situation, may receive very little pertinent
guidance for their application when he consults Civil Affairs doctrine. Recent Civil Affairs guidance
not only deals with dual roles of CA personnel, but treats those roles across the operational spectrum.
Further, the commander exercising operational control over CA may receive them in teams, task
forces, detachments, or as individuals. It is seldom that an entire unit is activated, even though that is
how they are configured prior to mobilization. Therefore the commander may use CA personnel as
unit commanders, staff augmentees, in indirect support, to conduct direct CA operations, or as
advisors to work with host nation officials. Even such an experienced and accomplished Army
commander as General Max Thurman, observed after his experience in Operation JUST CAUSE in
Panama, that he underestimated the CA implications of the mission and did not know how to use his
CA units to their best advantage.214

3.

Accessibility of CA

The desirability of using Civil Affairs forces is offset by the difficulty of getting them.215 One of the
great challenges to utilizing any capability in the reserves, is discovering how to gain access to it.
Methods for accessing reserve elements are varied, complex, and intertwined with concepts of
national will and the rights of service members. These factors often cause employing CA assets to be
seen as “more trouble than it’s worth”.
The Presidential “Call-Up”
When most people consider the use of reserve forces, they may think about a Presidential “call-up,”
which during the Cold War, presaged a major threat or invocation of national will. The reluctance to
use Presidential authority reached its zenith during the Vietnam War, when the political decision not
to mobilize the reserves, had far-reaching, and perhaps dire consequences for the US effort in
Southeast Asia.216
Since then, the reluctance to use Presidential authority to activate reservists has undergone gradual
and steady erosion. With the decision to call to arms troops for operations in the Gulf War, Haiti, and
Southeast Europe, the political fear of a reserve call-up has effectively evaporated. That is not to say
that a call-up decision is easy or without political consequences, merely that it can be done in an
almost routine manner when sufficient reasons exist for activation.
Part of the reason for the acceptance of Presidential call-up, is that it no longer connotes a general
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mobilization, but can be (and has been) invoked to access certain capabilities, e.g. Civil Affairs,
within the reserve structure. Still, for small operations, the President is unlikely to use his authority
to call up reservists without their consent, “even for large operations, such an involuntary call up may
not occur until the operation is well underway.”217
Limited Activation Authorities
Less drastic, and more common, means of activation have become the norm for accessing certain
capabilities that a CINC or other force “user” may need to accomplish the missions. These lesser
means can activate reservists either as volunteers, or as personnel ordered to active duty for short
periods of time. Volunteer reservists can be placed on active duty under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d) while
reservists can be ordered active for 15 days under 10 U.S.C. §12301(b) and for up to 270 days per
operation under 10 U.S.C. §12304(a).
These means of activating Reservists (Temporary Tours of Active Duty or performance of annual
training) give the CINCs the ability and flexibility to plan for the best use of all forces required for
mission accomplishment. The lead-time allows reserve (e.g. CA) units the time to identify and
activate requested assets. Most reserve support to CINC operations comes about as a result of
creative and aggressive use of these legal authorities.
While defense officials are concerned about the possibility of angering reservists, not to mention
their families and employers, because of frequent activations, to date there have been no major
political or legal outcries because of the operational use of reservists. Although there are continuing,
and even growing, concerns about “burning out” CA assets, and about employer relations, reemployment rights, etc. the rigorous use of USAR CA assets has not yet resulted in a breakdown in
morale. Indeed, the opposite seems to be true. There is much anecdotal evidence to show that a CA
reservist would rather support a “real-world” mission than engage in the kind of static and often
contrived training which characterized many annual training situations before 1983.
OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO
One of the greatest concerns about employing CA personnel today is the unusually high operational
and personnel tempo at which the force has been engaged. CA assets are limited, and strained by
numerous deployments, which now include nine rotations to Bosnia and the deployment to Kosovo–
Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. High operational tempo is difficult to manage and creates
challenges both for the CA commanders and the forces and commands which they support. These
challenges include: maintaining force capability to meet CINCs’ end-state vision; accessing reserve
CA soldiers quickly, managing unit member attrition; maintaining language and Military
Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualification; and minimizing the impact of deployments on the
families and jobs of reservists.
The fear, of course, is that the high OPTEMPO will discourage CA reservists from remaining active
in the military and create challenges for maintaining CA capabilities. Retention, therefore is a major
concern and Congress has taken steps to encourage re-enlistment and retention.218 This issue is
especially sensitive because it can have a direct influence on the morale and manning of the unit, and
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can become the object of media or political focus. One danger of high OPTEMPO is the risk of
losing good and qualified Reservists and replacing them with people who are underemployed or are
seeking adventure.
The Chief of the Army Reserves, Major General Plewes, and the commander of the United States
Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) have recently spoken to
this issue. General Plewes reported to the Civil Affairs Association that CA, “must remain accessible
as the most-deployed part of the force.”219 He also said that the USAR CA force possesses
“knowledge that no other force in the world has,” and reported that it was “91% deployable,” a fact
which suggests that it is in “greater readiness than ever before.”220 General Plewes observed that
recently the “tempo has come down a little” but nevertheless suggested other ways to alleviate the
OPTEMP problem [discussed in the following discussion on CA units and design].
Brigadier General Bingham, the USACAPOC commander, reported that in spite of the fact that CA
deployments were currently underway in four CINCs’ regions, for the past two years CA has met its
end strength objectives, although an officer shortage is starting to be felt. Officer qualification was
reported at 83 percent (a relatively high figure). General Bingham’s Mobilization Officer reported
that reserve CA officers exhibit a high state of morale and are remaining in their units.221 This
assertion is shared by MAJ Amy Johnson, the editor of the Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter, who
observed, after researching this topic, “…that despite the ever-increasing OPTEMPO, [CA] retention
has never been higher…”222
4.

Civil Affairs Units

Command and Control of CA
There are 36 USAR CA units consisting of approximately 5,500 reserve soldiers. These units are
apportioned to the theater CINCs for operational control and are commanded by the US Special
Operations Command, although they are administered by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserves.
Traditionally, CA units have supported conventional Army units. They continue to play that role,
although since 1989, Civil Affairs units have joined Special Forces and Psychological Operations in
the family of Special Operations Forces. Thus CA, as a consequence of its diverse nature and
applicability across the spectrum of operations, answers to Army reserve, conventional and special
operations hierarchies.
CA Unit Designs, Apportionment, and Assignments
It should come as no surprise to learn that with the number of roles expected of them, CA units have
been considered for redesign and reapportionment. In fact, since 1987, CA unit designations, designs,
and numbers have been scrutinized almost as often as its doctrine. In a very far-reaching attempt to
design CA units for both conventional and special operations, the Combined Arms Committee at Ft.
Leavenworth upgraded the traditional units into commands, brigades, and battalions. This TRADOC
effort reflected greater rank structure and “diplomatic” capabilities of unit personnel, which were
then deemed necessary. It also created a new CA type unit - the Foreign Internal
Defense/Unconventional Warfare (FID/UW) battalion – designed to support low-intensity conflict
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missions.
USAR CA units have used these general unit designs to meet the numerous demands placed on them
in the past decade. Since the majority of peacetime requirements have not required the activation of
entire units (with the notable exception of Operation DESERT STORM), CA personnel have been
reorganized into detachments, elements, teams, and civil-military task forces. These CA elements,
repositories of professional functional specialties; regional knowledge; and, coordination skills, have
been utilized almost continuously since Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989.
Over the past four years nine different rotations of CA teams have been deployed to Bosnia. This
effort, conducted while other requirements continued apace (e.g. Macedonia, Kosovo, and East
Timor), caused the USACAPOC to go outside the regionally apportioned CA units to fulfill the
Bosnia mission. It is this constant effort which has focused attention on CA and its ability to continue
to function successfully.
Plans for Expansion and Reconfiguration of USAR CA Units
It is in this context that Generals Plewes and Bingham made their remarks to the Civil Affairs
Association in January 2000. They reported that the USAR is planning to create 1,128 new CA
personnel spaces over the next six years. Between 8-15 slots will be created in the 36 existing units,
while three new battalions, and a FID/UW battalion will be created. In addition, ten CA tactical
teams, and a language team will be created for more flexible response to operational requirements.223
In order to make it clear that size alone will not solve the challenges facing CA, General Bingham
announced that a new policy is now in effect which will allow CA reservists to be deployed for 180
days vice the 279 days which had been the norm previously. General Plewes also started that his
force planners need to be asking themselves, “What do we really need for your [CA] force? Since we
are involved in small scale contingencies, maybe we should re-think the types of units, and perhaps
consider a new structure.”224

5.

Funding for CA Demining Support

The Complex Nature of DOD Demining Funds
The unique nature of the humanitarian demining mission makes its funding path complex.
Humanitarian demining does not reflect a core-war fighting capability, nor (surprisingly) is it very
much akin to military mine clearance and breaching. While Congress has appropriated a generous
amount of money for the implementation of the program, interpreting and implementing the
authorization for spending those funds has proven to be more problematic. Not only does demining
money have to “pass muster” for its applicability to the family of activities countenanced under the
ODHACA umbrella, but it must also account for the unique idiosyncrasies of humanitarian demining
as well.
LTC Jan Papra of the 350th Civil Affairs Command has observed that US military has defined
taskings under Title 10, and identified funding sources for these taskings. The military taskings are
70

naturally focused on war fighting, while the US State department retains the lead for global
Humanitarian Assistance.
LTCPapra points out, however, that situations arise when the US Government requires (or the
Department of State requests), military participation in what is determined to be a humanitarian
undertaking. Both special federal legislation and special funding procedures initiated which
authorize the use of military elements, for humanitarian purposes and funding for their participation.
The military authority and funding for humanitarian demining is described under section 2551 of US
Law. When deployed by the Secretary of Defense under this law and this funding, the military is
properly and legally engaged.
The Active Component of the Army, in particular the Special Operations Forces community, has been
engaged in conducting humanitarian demining regularly. The Army Reserve Special Operations
community, consisting of CA and PSYOP has not been engaged. Consistently Reserve elements are
authorized to conduct such missions under title 2551, as their active component brethren are. One
reason that they have not supported this mission, however, is that the deployments generally last
longer than the traditional two week reserve Annual Training period [Title 2551 only provides travel
and per-diem and it was assumed that the reserve force would not be capable of supporting the
salaries necessary.] therefore, the Active Component has until recently been relied upon to execute
the mission without reserve augmentation.
Now however, in an attempt to access the reserves to support the HDO mission, and to allow the m
to shoulder some of the mission load which has gradually become too much for the active
component, new legislation seeks to allow greater for reserve participation. By allocating some
demining dollars for reserve use, and allowing those funds to pay for reserve salaries as well as perdiem, reserve CA forces can be employed more effectively.
The Legislative Attempt to Fund CA Support of Humanitarian Demining
In 1997 Secretary of Defense Cohen stated his intention to “seek to remove legal impediments to
reservists participating in demining programs” and noted that “Civil Affairs/PSYOPS personnel . . .
are key to mine awareness and demining training support.”225 The General Counsel of the Secretary
of Defense, proposed a legislative change (in letters to the House and Senate, dated 16 April 1999,)
recommended by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC), which would have allowed 10% of the funds fenced for
humanitarian demining purposes (under 10 U.S.C. §401(e)(5)), to be used to cover reservist pay and
allowances. The analysis for the proposed section read in part as follows:
“The proposed amendment would help ease the OPTEMPO pressure on Active
Component (AC) Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations (CA/PSYOP) forces
imposed by HD missions . . .. The vast majority of support was performed by AC
personnel (14.77 man-years) rather than [Reserve Component] RC personnel (1.24
man-years) . . .. Politico-military developments around the world could easily require
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commitment of the entire AC civil affairs and PSYOP capability on short notice,
leaving planned HD operations without support. In FY 96, 12 countries were
receiving humanitarian demining assistance; in FY98, 21 countries received
assistance with additional countries seeking approval for demining programs from
the United States. The number of countries projected for approval in FY99 is 28.”226
Based on this information, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 bill in the
Senate, (S. 1059), contained a provision for allowing humanitarian assistance funds to be used for
reservist pay, and was passed by the Senate on 27 May 1999, 92 to 3.227 It read:
“SEC. 312. Use of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Funding for Pay and
Allowances of Special Operations Command Reserves Furnishing Demining
Training and Related Assistance as Humanitarian Assistance. Section 401(c) of title
10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
(5) Up to 5 percent of the funds available in any fiscal year for humanitarian and
civic assistance described in subsection (e)(5) may be expended for the pay and
allowances of reserve component personnel of the Special Operations Command for
periods of duty for which the personnel, for a humanitarian purpose, furnish
education and training on the detection and clearance of landmines or furnish related
technical assistance.”228
However, the House version (H.R. 1401), did not contain the provision, though the DOD had
proposed the same legislation to both the House and the Senate. In the joint conference, the House
opposed the Senate on the provision, and the Conference Report merely states that the Senate
“receded.”229
Possible Methods for Funding of USAR CA Support to Demining
While the recent legislative effort to make funds available to access RC CA has not yet come to
fruition, other means may exist for resourcing reserve CA personnel to support DOD humanitarian
demining activities. These include the possibility of:
•
•

•

The OASD SO/LIC, which spearheaded the first effort to change the legislative
authority, to renew its efforts in Congress.
The USAR using some of its allotted funds for Temporary Tours of Active Duty
(TTAD) specifically for supporting CA demining activities. [The problem with this
approach is that the limited amounts of TTAD money are usually budgeted in
advance and are prioritized by the Army Special Operations Command.]
Using the CINC’s Initiative Fund. In October, Congress provided Public Law 106-79
$25,000,000 for the CINC Initiative Fund Account.230 The CINC’s Initiative Fund
“shall be in addition to amounts otherwise available for that activity for that fiscal
year,”231 and may be used for the following purposes (several of which may include
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support the funding of CA personnel to carry out demining activities for the CINC):
(1) Force training;
(2) Contingencies;
(3) Selected operations.
(4) Command and control.
(5) Joint exercises (including activities of participating foreign countries);
(6) Humanitarian and civil assistance;
(7) Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel
of foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative
expenses);
(8) Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional
cooperation programs; and
(9) Force protection.232
[The problem with this approach is that CINCs’ Initiative Funds are also limited and are usually used
as of way for the CINC to endorse a special program or to show support for a particular nation in his
area of responsibility.]
•

Using the CINC’s Initiative Fund. Under 10 USCS § 168, Military-to-Military
Contacts and Comparable Activities, “The Secretary of Defense may conduct
military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that are designed to encourage
a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other
countries.” Authorized activities include:
(1) The activities of traveling contact teams, including any transportation expense,
translation services expense, or administrative expense that is related to such
activities.
(2) The activities of military liaison teams.
(3) Exchanges of civilian or military personnel between the Department of Defense
and defense ministries of foreign governments.
(4) Exchanges of military personnel between units of the armed forces and units of
foreign armed forces.
(5) Seminars and conferences held primarily in a theater of operations.
(6) Distribution of publications primarily in a theater of operations.
(7) Personnel expenses for Department of Defense civilian and military personnel to
the extent that those expenses relate to participation in an activity described in
paragraph (3), (4), (5), or (6).
(8) Reimbursement of military personnel appropriations accounts for the pay and
allowances paid to reserve component personnel for service while engaged in any
activity referred to in another paragraph of this subsection.233

[The problem with this approach is that these contacts are scrutinized very carefully by the Congress,
which has a great interest in how “mil-to-mil” contacts are generated and what they yield.]
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Section VII – Conclusions: Options for the Application of Civil Affairs
Capabilities to Mine Action Operations
The conclusions of this report attempt to suggest pragmatic applications of CA to the humanitarian
demining mission. Before informed options can be suggested concerning appropriate roles for CA in
mine action, however, it is necessary to examine CA humanitarian demining capabilities (assessed in
Section V), in light of the external factors (discussed in Section VI).
This analysis can be accomplished best by suggesting first how the identified humanitarian demining
applications of CA capabilities might be accomplished in terms of the relevant CA mission areas:
•
•
•
•

Planning Humanitarian Demining Operations
Conducting Humanitarian Demining Operations
Supporting Humanitarian Demining Operations
Advising Humanitarian Demining Operations

These CA mine action roles are then analyzed based on the possible impact which external factors
are likely to have on them. The major external factors bearing on CA in support of mine action
activities are:
•
•
•
•
•

1.

US humanitarian demining policy, guidance, and political will
CA as part of the demining force structure
The accessibility of CA elements
The CA force and unit configuration
Funding for CA demining support

Notional Applications of CA to Humanitarian Demining Operations

Planning Humanitarian Demining Operations
The analysis of Civil Affairs capabilities suggests that CA planners be involved in HDO planning in:
the pre-deployment phase, the development of measures of effectiveness (MOE), the establishment
of milestones and hand-off points, the formulation of the exit strategy, and post deployment
evaluation. It is clear that doctrine expects CA planners to integrate civil-military activities at all
operational levels, and to coordinate US military efforts with other US agencies, the host nation,
NGOs, the National Demining Office, and other state (and even non-state) players.
CA planning cells are typically not large. It does not take a 125-man unit to help develop milestones,
hand-off points, MOEs, or even an exit strategy. It must be remembered that CA is not in the lead in
developing a CINC plan, but CA planners integrate civil military considerations with other plans, i.e.
the SF train-the-trainer program, PSYOP mine awareness plans, etc. But it does call for a planning
cell which knows the host country, knows the functional specialties which are required in the
country’s development plans (or needs), and has the ability to draw from pertinent areas of expertise
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within the CA unit or from other sources.
A CA planning cell, therefore, is typically a small team, which can do much of its preparatory (and
monitoring) work at its home station while not on active duty at all. When the cell does deploy, it
need not be activated for 279 or even 180 days. If the cell utilizes effective means to stay in touch
with the CINC staff prior to visiting the host nation, it can use annual duty for training (ADT) for
two to four weeks a year, to accomplish actual on-site coordination, “eyes-on-target” assessments,
and necessary collaboration with the CINC.
Conducting Humanitarian Demining Operations
CA activities, in which soldiers perform actions directly in the area of operations, often have to do
with the care, feeding, movement, and provision of emergency medical aid to a civilian population;
often consisting of displaced civilians or refugees. Normally this is done by the active component CA
unit, Special Forces teams, or other US military units which may be on the scene. However, there are
times (such as when emergency aid was provided to the Kurds in Northern Iraq at the end of the Gulf
War, in Operation PROVIDE HOPE), when because of the scope of the problem, or political
sensitivities, USAR units are employed. This can also occur because health or safety issues require
more of a CA presence (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama), or the application of a specific
functional specialty (restoration of penal and legal systems in Haiti during Operation RESTORE
DEMOCRACY).
Since the above operations were the result of contingency operations which engaged the top US
national military authorities, they do not fall into the realm of CA actions which one would expect to
see in the support of normal humanitarian demining country operations. Country plans for demining
should be deliberate, occurring in a benign and peaceful environment, and should be characterized by
the evolutionary development of the host nation infrastructure. That is not to say that a demining
operation in a country could not uncover greater problems than envisioned initially or that an
emergency could not occur during a demining operation, but these would be exceptions. While
USAR CA forces may be used by the CINCs to apply their skills to the above tasks, these emergency
missions would not come under the aegis of the Humanitarian Demining Program, but perhaps other
components of the OHDACA family of humanitarian activities.
Within the context of HDO, the following SOF roles exist. Special Forces teams are charged with
conducting ‘train-the-trainer’ operations, PSYOP teams are charged with training and conducting
mine awareness campaigns, and reserve CA units can be charged with training management,
computer, administrative and other staff skills to host nation representatives. This mission, while not
currently being exercised often, could be very valuable to a demining operation. Just as SF and
PSYOP ‘train the trainers’, CA could be called upon to ‘train the managers’. This is no insignificant
task where the sustainability of the program by the host nation, and incidentally the running of the
National Demining Office, is seen as a critical yardstick for success.
Therefore, the possibility of accessing and using identified members of CA units to conduct relevant
management, computer, and administrative training with host nation demining officials should not be
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overlooked. Indeed, with the current reliance on information management, personnel selection,
coordination requirements, the complex nature of demining operations, and especially the desire to
have the US turn over the demining mission to a host nation, the management training mission
should not be taken lightly.
The selection of small management training cells should be relatively easy for a USAR unit to
accomplish, and as in the case of planning teams, they can accomplish much preparation within the
home unit and deploy only for short periods of time. Indeed, class schedules could be coordinated
with the home unit so as to minimize unit turbulence and to synchronize training events with other
CINC-planned activities (demining or other) in the supported country. Training sessions should not
be unduly long, given the rudimentary and basic nature of the US commitment, i.e. these are not
nation building missions. While trainers should return for refresher and next-cycle training, they need
not be present continuously.
While most HDOs will probably only require small CA teams, there is a possibility of a country in
such need that the CA team might need to consist of 15-30 soldiers to ensure a full, comprehensive
program.
Supporting Humanitarian Demining Operations
Civil Affairs support operations are those activities which CA does not have the responsibility to
carry out, but which they prepare, facilitate, and support through various actions and services. Much
of this work comes under the all-important CA activity of coordination. In many ways, liaison
actions form the lifeblood of CA. While some may think of coordination, as subsidiary or even
unnecessary work, it is basis on which most peacetime civil-military operations agreements and
plans are made – and the foundations, on which those operations often stand or fall.
Coordination is a critical need in keeping demining operations efforts synchronized. The large
number of organizations and functions involved in a mine action campaign can be monitored, and to
a degree synchronized, by the performance of CA liaison and integration tasks. CA liaison officers
can begin coordination activities among US DOD agencies, but must also integrate US military plans
with other USG agencies, NGOs, UN agencies, for-profit companies, and host nation officials, as
appropriate.
CA can coordinate with various kinds of organizations, and it needs to begin these liaison activities
before the deployment of US forces, and it must continue performing them throughout the mission.
Proper CA coordination can start an operation in a positive manner by facilitating an efficient entry
into the host nation, while it can send a clear message as to the goals the US will pursue and what
support the host nation is expected to give. Coordination needs to occur at the highest levels of the
host nation, and also at the operational and tactical levels.
Proper coordination can lead to a consensus of transition and milestone points, areas of congruity and
partnership, logistical support, logical prioritization of clearance efforts, burden sharing, the
effectiveness (or even existence) of the National Demining Office (NDO), and appropriate
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measurements of and reporting of MOEs. In short, while coordination efforts in classic combat
operation may not ultimately depend on coordination among so many non-military players, the more
complex and sensitive a civil-military operation, such as humanitarian demining, the more critical
are the coordinating tasks.
CA liaison and coordination actions can take place during the Policy Assessment Visit, the Site
Survey, during implementation of the project, during key transition or hand-off phases, and during
the exit stage. CA rank structure makes possible liaison at the very highest levels of government, to
the very lowest local operations.
CA liaison officers are usually employed as individuals, even though they may be deployed with
other CA elements of their home unit. As such they are also deployed singly, or in small teams.
While liaison officers should be employed at various phases of the operation and at various layers,
these facilitators need not stay in country for very long. Their job is to broker agreements,
partnerships, convene meetings, suggest procedures, etc. Therefore once these “start-up” activities
are done, the job is temporarily completed. Other liaison officers can visit periodically to reinforce
and reinvigorate initial agreements, or the same officer can return to maintain continuity. This is one
area where maintaining a small cell, ideally in the NDO, might pay great dividends, and would repay
the resources incurred by a 180 day activation.
Advisors to Humanitarian Demining Operations
Civil Affairs personnel have often been called upon to provide expert opinions and recommendations
to civil and military officials. Operations in Panama, Kuwait and Haiti have been characterized by
this unique CA capability. A team of functional experts from the CA unit, or more usually, from a
number of units (if possible from units assigned to that region of the world), have been formed to
provide high level advice on the condition, restoration, development, or analysis of various portions
of the national infrastructure. Usually the functional teams are designed based on perceived needs of
the host nation. Panama was identified to have a need for civilian police training and neighborhood
rebuilding. Kuwaitis needed help identifying and setting up contracts. Haiti required the redesign of
its penal and legal system.
Humanitarian demining operations are typically the first steps in the development of a region, which
is devastated or dysfunctional. Before meaningful mine clearance operations begin, surveys, plans,
and priorities must be conducted. These missions can be facilitated by functional specialists who can
evaluate the development needs of the country, in terms of the market economy, health
considerations, education, public transportation, agriculture, etc. It is also necessary to identify areas
of priority for clearance, mine awareness, marking and monitoring, victim assistance, and other mine
action steps based on infrastructure needs. In one country, for example the Sudan, there may be a
strong emphasis on restoring basic agricultural activities. In Angola, the great need may be for
resettlement of refugees and displaced civilians. In Croatia, the overriding requirement may be for
home construction.
The host nation then must prioritize areas scheduled for mine action, and plan for developmental
80

activities to be planned and carried out in conjunction with them. This is an area where the individual
CA functional specialists can work with local or national officials to suggest, not only prioritization
of actions and areas to be cleared, but specific restoration, reconstitution, and development steps and
sequences.
As with the other applied capabilities (planning, training, and coordinating) CA support should come
in the form of a small team or probably, one individual. It has not been unusual, in previous CMOs,
for CA advisors to become trusted friends to supported host nation officials. The CA advisor, as with
the other roles which have been examined, would be employed best for short activation periods,
probably two of three weeks at a time, but complement these periods of deployment with follow-up
evaluations and reports.
2.

The Effect of External Factors on Applications of CA to HDOs

The Effect of US policy, guidance, and political will on CA Planning
US policy does not regard humanitarian demining operations as engaging vital or strategic American
interests. Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect that the US would employ USAR CA personnel to
support HDO, if such employment would deplete DOD, or CA resources significantly.
However, we have also determined that the national security policy assumes that a modest effort in
the nature of planned, deliberate, and modest mine action campaigns can support various goals,
chiefly under the rubric of the CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plan. If CA reservists can be utilized in
small numbers and for relatively short periods of voluntary activation, thus avoiding a high profile
mobilization, resource-intensive taskings, and non-voluntary call-up authorities, the effort would
seem to justify using CA assets to conduct and support demining missions. Accepting the parameters
of demining operations described above, the support of these operations should not create a high
political or financial profile.
CA Place in the Demining Force Team
CA soldiers are part of the SOF team. It is axiomatic that the more synchronized and represented the
team is, the better it functions. SF, PSYOP, and CA planners should plan together whenever feasible.
Therefore, using CA planners is a goal to be desired at any time within the SOF context, and should
bring quite a lot to the overall CINC demining team.
While it is true that SF and active component CA soldiers are trained to perform CA duties, these
duties are of the tactical (emergency services, feeding, housing, refugee movement, etc.) variety, and
not of the advanced planning, coordination, or advisory nature. Such actions frequently require the
application of functional specialty and negotiating skills. It has been accepted as a truism, that the
method of applying CA “civilian” skills in tandem with other SOF teams, enhances the tactical and
public awareness missions undertaken by those (SF and PSYOP) elements.
Using CA reservists, however, is however, one of the activities which has often has often been
characterized by confusion or hesitation. However, most commanders today pay great attention to
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civil-military (or G-5) issues, especially since OHDACA missions form a great part of the CINCs’
Theater Engagement activities. Nevertheless, one must anticipate that a commander will give more
credence to his dedicated (fulltime) staff and commanders, than to his apportioned USAR CA unit.
This is understandable. However, if the mission is basically civil-military in character, then one
would hope that the field or operational commander would defer to his USAR CA
commander/advisor for trusted advice. This situation can be assured by creating a strong bond
between CA units and the CINCs which they support, through routine and continuous training and
exercise play.
USAR CA units need to receive guidance from staff elements of the CINC, or to units to which they
are assigned or attached; even though those assignments may be predicated on large-scale (or
“wartime”) operations. In a typical humanitarian demining scenario, CA officers normally would
receive instructions and provide feedback through the J-5 section of the CINC (or SOC) staff and
report their actions there. Often the CINC demining team will be a small force, and the CA officer
will report to the local commander in charge of the demining operation. The commander can delegate
negotiating and CMO responsibilities to CA officers, but their principal duties will be to create
support and linkages among demining organizations that the CINC, or his designated operation
commander, desires.
Accessibility of USAR CA Personnel
Gaining access to CA individuals or small teams on a short-term basis should not be a problem. As
stated earlier, given the basis for demining operations, there is no need for an entire unit or even a
large team to be activated. There should seldom, if ever, be a need to activate a planning cell under
the rubric of a Presidential call-up authority. Small teams should be able to plan without being
activated for long periods of time, utilizing temporary tours of active duty, or annual training for
duty, authorization.
What is necessary, however, is that CA units apportioned to a CINC possess sufficient resident
functional specialty skills, civilian professional expertise, military experience, and regional
knowledge to enable the CINC to plan for these capabilities with confidence. This is a challenge,
which the CA community takes very seriously, and is a perennial concern of CA, SOF, and Army
commanders. The “evergreen” issue of CA functional specialty qualification is the key to success in
an environment, which is fluid, complex, and not prone to schoolbook solutions. The evidence, as a
result of CA participation (and accolades) in the operations mentioned previously, is that CA, when
called upon has performed civil military duties with distinction.
One other consideration must be made when contemplating the use of CA personnel, and that is
OPTEMPO. Given the number of times that USAR reserve forces have been activated over the past
decade, it may be that any given unit may be unable to access unit members who have the requisite
functional area or regional skills, because they will have been “used up.” In accessing the few
members of the unit required for demining support, however, it is unlikely that all CA personnel with
the required skills will be deployed or non-deployable. And even if this were the case, the
USACAPOC headquarters has proven most adept at identifying personnel with similar skills in other
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CA units. The OPTEMPO issue should recede as the planned and gradual expansion of the force
takes place (see below). However, that assumption only holds true if CA is not called upon for
increased participation in military contingencies.
Gaining access to the few CA unit members should not be a problem, except when too many teams
are employed at the same time; either in support of demining, or other missions. Therefore, it would
be necessary to plan and synchronize even the short deployment periods so that the unit is able to
function as a unit at all times, and to maximize the teams’ interoperability. The key point is that CA
officers need not be activated for long periods of time, although frequent returns to the host country
may pay dividends. Even in a very active demining program where constant coordination is
necessary, a very few voluntary activations of 180 days should be sufficient.
If CA is tasked to support many different demining operations simultaneously, OPTEMPO may grow
as an issue. While the CA force itself could probably resource demining coordination needs, other
CA missions may suffer, or conversely, other more important CA missions may override the
requirement for CA to support some demining country programs. These questions of priority can be
suggested in planning sessions, policy fora, and the like, but in the last analysis, the CINC must
decide how to utilize his assets best.
CA Unit Configuration and Integrity
CA cells are sometimes organized as definite entities within the unit, sometimes they are taskorganized from various parts of the CA unit or units. While elements comprising a cell are drawn
from the unit, neither it nor the unit should find its organic capabilities seriously depleted if the cell
is deployed separately from the home unit for a short time. In the time that an ADT period occurs, the
team may have missed no or only one drill period(s). Further, the unit’s understanding of the CINC’s
plans and operations should be enhanced by the feedback, which the planning cell can impart to its
home unit upon its return. The employment of liaison officers in support of a demining operation,
therefore, does not mean that the integrity of the unit will be destroyed, although it might be
marginalized if other teams (planning, advisors, trainers, etc.) are activated simultaneously. If
planning is done properly, CA teams can stagger their deployments to minimize strain on the entire
unit. This presupposes good internal planning on the part of the unit, and cooperation and timely
guidance from the CINC’s staff.
In a way which often seems ironic to non-reservists, short active duty assignments, such as CA
demining support can actually enhance personnel retention. There are those, who for employment,
family, or other reasons, cannot personally be activated for long periods of time, but who sincerely
wish to make a contribution to national defense. Many reservists find that supporting “real world”
missions during short activations can be a very gratifying way to fulfill their service obligations and
responsibilities. If mine action missions can offer shorter periods of activation which still allow unit
members to contribute in a definite and meaningful way, unit retention, as well as morale may rise.
It is also a simple truism that as the expansion of CA units occurs over the next five years, there will
simply be more personnel, teams, and units to take on these tasks. The unit will be able to absorb the
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short term loss of such cells more easily, as larger units and the addition of newly configured teams,
will enable the CA force to accept these kind of missions more routinely.
Funding for CA Demining Support
If CA planning cells are small and can conduct their tasks at home station and during short periods of
active duty, especially ADT, the financial impact should be minimal. Indeed funds should be no more
than if the cell performed during an exercise in the CINC’s area of responsibility. Nevertheless, it
would alleviate even this small support effort, if ODHACA funds were made available to reserve
forces supporting a CINC’s humanitarian demining activities. And if the number of demining efforts
required of CA goes up significantly, this kind of support may be necessary.
While the CINC may decide to use discretionary funds to support these demining activities, or the
USAR may fund them, it would seem most satisfactory to apply funds appropriated to DOD
specifically to support demining missions for Reserve support of humanitarian demining. Therefore
support of demining activities would probably be planned, integrated and implemented if ODHACA
funds were made available to Reserve SOF personnel required to support the CINCs’ humanitarian
demining program.

3.

The Decision to Apply USAR CA Capabilities to HDOs

When the US first entered the humanitarian demining operations arena (1993-4), demining activities
generally centered around mine clearance activities; that is, the process of detecting and neutralizing
landmines. As such, the perceived needs were narrowly described: training future deminers how to
probe for landmines, then how to blow them in place. Shortly thereafter, greater attention was paid to
mine awareness as a way of avoiding accidents, and then victim assistance, as a way of helping
people cope with accidents.
The concept of prioritizing “mine action” (a fairly new term for the panoply of actions now
contemplated under the term humanitarian demining) activities, and coordinating those plans with
other organizations in a general development scheme, is a more recent phenomena. Therefore, it was
natural to assign SF and PSYOP teams to demining missions, while the need for CA was generally
not yet felt. When the need was discerned, the natural resistance to using reservists had to be
overcome. But at the time, reserve CA forces were being activated at a dizzying pace for other
peacetime contingencies. Therefore, most of the demining missions, which could have made
valuable use of CA were either accomplished by the active duty CA unit, the 96th Battalion, SF
soldiers, other units on the scene, or were simply not done.
Humanitarian demining is a limited scope activity. US officials do not intend it to be a nation
building exercise, although there is the realization that rudimentary development must drive mine
action activities if their results are to be lasting. Therefore, it has been easy to overlook the
participation of CA. However, the current situation suggests that the role of reserve CA capabilities
in support of the US humanitarian demining program should be reviewed. USAR CA forces are
uniquely qualified to perform key CMO, which can literally frame a demining operation. CA
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personnel possess negotiating and functional specialty skills, which can help define and prioritize
development goals at the core of demining efforts. CA can facilitate country clearances and arrange
logistical support for the local DOD demining operation.
The cost of utilizing the CA assets does not seem to be high. The deliberate nature of humanitarian
demining lends itself to time-phased planning, while the short duration of activation for CA teams
does not require the authority of a non-voluntary call-up of reserves.
The use of CA reservists seems all the more attractive as one considers that the force is due to be
expanded significantly in the next five years. If a way if found to apply funds set aside for US
humanitarian demining operations, to fund the pay and allowances of participating CA reservists,
then the force could be employed with even more imagination and flexibility.

Appendix A
Civil Affairs Functions in Support of Mine Action Requirements
Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO) are generally organized into phases, which have
been analyzed and modeled notionally by JMU in Accessibility of Information and Materials
Required to Conduct Humanitarian Demining Operations – Task 3. The HDO phases have
been further broken down into a hierarchy of component tasks. The following tables depict
each phase of a typical HDO, and relate possible civil affairs support in relation to each
component task within that particular phase.
The following chart should be used when referring to the tables in the appendix, to interpret
the type of support, which might be rendered by Civil Affairs units, teams, or personnel.
Support Level
1

Support Role
Conduct

Role Description
Performs Mission*

2

Support

Supports Mission Actively

3

Indirect Support

Supports Mission through reports
or other passive means

*Does not assume that Civil solely is necessarily responsible for the task.

•
•
•
•

Table A-1, Civil Affairs Support to the Planning Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation
Table A-2, Civil Affairs Support to the Deployment Phase of a Humanitarian Demining
Operation
Table A-3a, Civil Affairs Support to the Operations-Clearance Phase of a Humanitarian
Demining Operation
Table A-3b, Civil Affairs Support to the Operations-Victim Assistance Phase of a Humanitarian
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•
•
•
•

Demining Operation
Table A-3c, Civil Affairs Support to the Operations-Mine Awaerness Phase of a Humanitarian
Demining Operation
Table A-4, Civil Affairs Support to the Sustainment Phase of a Humanitarian Demining
Operation
Table A-5, Civil Affairs Support to the End State Phase of a Humanitarian Demining Operation
Table A-6, Civil Affairs Support to the Evaluation Phase of a Humanitarian Demining
Operation
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